Chapter XIV — Concerning the Doctrines Held by the Different Sects of Ṣúfís

CHAPTER XIV. — CONCERNING THE DOCTRINES HELD BY THE DIFFERENT SECTS OF ṢÚFÍS.

I have already stated, in the notice of Abú ‘l-Ḥasan Núrí, that the Ṣúfís are divided into twelve sects, of which two are reprobated and ten are approved. Every one of these ten sects has an excellent system and doctrine as regards both purgation (mujáhadat) and contemplation (musháhadat). Although they differ from each other in their devotional practices and ascetic disciplines, they agree in the fundamentals and derivatives of the religious law and Unification. Abú Yazíd said : “The disagreement of divines is a mercy except as regards the detachment (tajríd)[^p200-1] of Unification ” ; and there is a famous tradition to the same effect. The real essence of Ṣúfíism lies amidst the traditions (akhbár) of the Shaykhs, and is divided only metaphorically and formally. Therefore I will briefly divide their sayings in explanation of Ṣúfíism and unfold the main principle on which the doctrine of each one of them is based, in order that the student may readily understand this matter.

i. THE MUḤÁSIBÍS.

They are the followers of Abú ʿAbdallah Ḥárith b. Asad al-Muḥásibí, who by consent of all his contemporaries was a man of approved spiritual influence and mortified passions (maqbúl al-nafas u maqtúl al-nafs), versed in theology, jurisprudence, and mysticism. He discoursed on detachment from the world and Unification, while his outward and inward dealings (with God) were beyond reproach. The peculiarity of his doctrine is this, that he does not reckon satisfaction (riḍá) among the ” stations ” (maqámát), but includes it in the ” states ” (aḥwál). He was the first to hold this view, which was adopted by the people of Khurásán. The people of ʿIráq, on the contrary, asserted that satisfaction is one of the ” stations ”, and that it is the extreme of trust in God (tawakkul). The controversy between them has gone on to the present day.[^p201-1]

Discourse on the true nature of Satisfaction and the explanation of this doctrine.

In the first place I will establish the true nature of satisfaction and set forth its various kinds ; then, secondly, I will explain the real meaning of ” station ” (maqám) and ” state ” (ḥál) and the difference between them.

Satisfaction is of two kinds : (a) the satisfaction of God with Man, and (b) the satisfaction of Man with God. Divine satisfaction really consists in God’s willing that Man should be recompensed (for his good works) and in His bestowing grace (karámat) upon him. Human satisfaction really consists in Man’s performing the command of God and submitting to His decree. Accordingly, the satisfaction of God precedes that of Man, for until Man is divinely aided he does not submit to God’s decree and does not perform His command, because Man’s satisfaction is connected with God’s satisfaction and subsists thereby. In short, human satisfaction is equanimity (istiwáʾ-yi dil) towards Fate, whether it withholds or bestows, and spiritual steadfastness (istiqámat) in regarding events, whether they be the manifestation of Divine Beauty (jamál) or of Divine Majesty (jalál), so that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the fire of wrath or illuminated by the light of mercy, because both wrath and mercy are evidences of God, and whatever proceeds from God is good in His eyes. The Commander of the Faithful, Ḥusayn b. ʿAlí, was asked about the saying of Abú Dharr Ghifárí : ” I love poverty better than riches, and sickness better than health.”

Ḥusayn replied : “God have mercy on Abá Dharr ! but I say that whoever surveys the excellent choice made by God for him does not desire anything except what God has chosen for him.” When a man sees God’s choice and abandons his own choice, he is delivered from all sorrow. This, however, does not hold good in absence from God (ghaybat) ; it requires presence with God (ḥuḍúr), because ” satisfaction expels sorrows and cures heedlessness ”, and purges the heart of thoughts relating to other than God and frees it from the bonds of tribulation ; for it is characteristic of satisfaction to deliver (rahánídan).

From the standpoint of ethics, satisfaction is the acquiescence of one who knows that giving and withholding are in God’s knowledge, and firmly believes that God sees him in all circumstances. There are four classes of quietists : (1) those who are satisfied with God’s gift (ʿaṭá), which is gnosis (maʿrifat) ; (2) those who are satisfied with happiness (nuʿmá), which is this world ; (3) those who are satisfied with affliction (balá), which consists of diverse probations ; and (4) those who are satisfied with being chosen (iṣṭifá), which is love (maḥabbat). He who looks away from the Giver to the gift accepts it with his soul, and when he has so accepted it trouble and grief vanish from his heart. He who looks away from the gift to the Giver loses the gift and treads the path of satisfaction by his own effort. Now effort is painful and grievous, and gnosis is only realized when its true nature is divinely revealed ; and inasmuch as gnosis, when sought by effort, is a shackle and a veil, such gnosis is non-cognition (nakirat). Again, he who is satisfied with this world, without God, is involved in destruction and perdition, because the whole world is not worth so much that a friend of God should set his heart on it or that any care for it should enter his mind. Happiness is happiness only when it leads to the Giver of happiness ; otherwise, it is an affliction. Again, he who is satisfied with the affliction that God sends is satisfied because in the affliction he sees the Author thereof and can endure its pain by contemplating Him who sent it ; nay, he does not account it painful, such is his joy in contemplating his Beloved. Finally, those who are satisfied with being chosen by God are His lovers, whose existence is an illusion alike in His anger and His satisfaction ; whose hearts dwell in the presence of Purity and in the garden of Intimacy ; who have no thought of created things and have escaped from the bonds of ” stations ” and ” states ” and have devoted themselves to the love of God. Their satisfaction involves no loss, for satisfaction with God is a manifest kingdom.

SECTION.

It is related in the Traditions that Moses said : ” O God, show me an action with which, if I did it, Thou wouldst be satisfied.” God answered : ” Thou canst not do that, O Moses ! ” Then Moses fell prostrate, worshipping God and supplicating Him, and God made a revelation to him, saying : ” O son of ʿImrán, My satisfaction with thee consists in thy being satisfied with My decree,” i.e. when a man is satisfied with God’s decrees it is a sign that God is satisfied with him.

Bishr Ḥáfí asked Fuḍayl b. ʿIyáḍ whether renunciation (zuhd) or satisfaction was better. Fuḍayl replied : ” Satisfaction, because he who is satisfied does not desire any higher stage,” i.e. there is above renunciation a stage which the renouncer desires, but there is no stage above satisfaction that the satisfied man should wish for it. Hence the shrine is superior to the gate. This story shows the correctness of Muḥásibí’s doctrine, that satisfaction belongs to the class of ” states ” and Divine gifts, not to the stages that are acquired (by effort). It is possible, however, that the satisfied man should have a desire. The Apostle used to say in his prayers : ” O God, I ask of Thee satisfaction after the going forth of Thy ordinance (al-riḍá baʿd al-qaḍá),” i.e. ” keep me in such a condition that when the ordinance comes to me from Thee, Destiny may find me satisfied with its coming”. Here it is affirmed that satisfaction properly is posterior to the advent of Destiny, because, if it preceded, it would only be a resolution to be satisfied, which is not the same thing as actual satisfaction. Abú ʾl-ʿAbbás b. ʿAṭá says : “Satisfaction is this, that the heart should consider the eternal choice of God on behalf of His creature,” i.e. whatever befalls him, he should recognize it as the eternal will of God and His past decree, and should not be distressed, but should accept it cheerfully. Ḥárith Muḥásibí, the author of the doctrine, says : “Satisfaction is the quiescence (sukún) of the heart under the events which flow from the Divine decrees.” This is sound doctrine, because the quiescence and tranquillity of the heart are not qualities acquired by Man, but are Divine gifts. And as an argument for the view that satisfaction is a “state”, not a “station”, they cite the story of ʿUtba al-Ghulám, who one night did not sleep, but kept saying : “If Thou chastise me I love Thee, and if Thou have mercy on me I love Thee,” i.e. “the pain of Thy chastisement and the pleasure of Thy bounty affect the body alone, whereas the agitation of love resides in the heart, which is not injured thereby”. This corroborates the view of Muḥásibí. Satisfaction is the result of love, inasmuch as the lover is satisfied with what is done by the Beloved. Abú ʿUthmán Ḥírí says : “During the last forty years God has never put me in any state that I disliked, or transferred me to another state that I resented.” This indicates continual satisfaction and perfect love. The story of the dervish who fell into the Tigris is well known. Seeing that he could not swim, a man on the bank cried out to him : “Shall I tell some one to bring you ashore ?” The dervish said, “No.” “Then do you wish to be drowned ?” “No.” “What, then, do you wish ?” The dervish replied : “That which God wishes. What have I to do with wishing ?”

The Ṣúfí Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on satisfaction, which differ in phraseology but agree in the two principles that have been mentioned.

The distinction between a “State” (ḥál) and a “Station” (maqám).

You must know that both these terms are in common use among Ṣúfís, and it is necessary that the student should be acquainted with them. I must discuss this matter here, although it does not belong to the present chapter.

” Station ” (maqám) denotes anyone’s ” standing ” in the Way of God, and his fulfilment of the obligations appertaining to that ” station ” and his keeping it until he comprehends its perfection so far as lies in a man’s power. It is not permissible that he should quit his ” station ” without fulfilling the obligations thereof. Thus, the first ” station ” is repentance (tawbat), then comes conversion (inábat), then renunciation (zuhd), then trust in God (tawakkul), and so on : it is not permissible that anyone should pretend to conversion without repentance, or to renunciation without conversion, or to trust in God without renunciation.

” State ” (ḥál), on the other hand, is something that descends from God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort. Accordingly, while the term ” station ” denotes the way of the seeker, and his progress in the field of exertion, and his rank before God in proportion to his merit, the term ” state ” denotes the favour and grace which God bestows upon the heart of His servant, and which are not connected with any mortification on the latter’s part. ” Station ” belongs to the category of acts, ” state ” to the category of gifts. Hence the man that has a ” station ” stands by his own self-mortification, whereas the man that has a ” state ” is dead to ” self ” and stands by a ” state ” which God creates in him.

Here the Shaykhs are at variance. Some hold that a ” state ” may be permanent, while others reject this view. Ḥárith Muḥásibí maintained that a ” state ” may be permanent. He argued that love and longing and ” contraction ” (qabḍ) and ” expansion ” (basṭ) are ” states ” : if they cannot be permanent, then the lover would not be a lover, and until a man’s ” state ” becomes his attribute (ṣifat) the name of that ” state ” is not properly applied to him. It is for this reason that he holds satisfaction to be one of the ” states ”, and the same view is indicated by the saying of Abú ʿUthmán : ” During the last forty years God has never put me in a ’ state ’ that I disliked.”

Other Shaykhs deny that a ” state ” can be permanent. Junayd says : ”‘ States ’ are like flashes of lightning : their permanence is merely a suggestion of the lower soul (nafs).” Some have said, to the same effect : ”‘ States ’ are like their name,” i.e. they vanish almost as soon as they descend (taḥíllu) on the heart. Whatever is permanent becomes an attribute, and attributes subsist in an object which must be more perfect than the attributes themselves ; and this reduces the doctrine that ” states ” are permanent to an absurdity. I have set forth the distinction between ” state ” and ” station ” in order that you may know what is signified by these terms wherever they occur in the phraseology of the Ṣúfís or in the present work.

In conclusion, you must know that satisfaction is the end of the ” stations ” and the beginning of the ” states ” : it is a place of which one side rests on acquisition and effort, and the other side on love and rapture : there is no ” station ” above it : at this point mortifications (mujáhadát) cease. Hence its beginning is in the class of things acquired by effort, its end in the class of things divinely bestowed. Therefore it may be called either a ” station ” or a ” state ”.

This is the doctrine of Muḥásibí as regards the theory of Ṣúfiism. In practice, however, he made no difference, except that he used to warn his pupils against expressions and acts which, though sound in principle, might be thought evil. For example, he had a ” king-bird ” (shádhmurghí), which used to utter a loud note. One day Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, who was Ḥárith’s pupil and an ecstatic man, came to see him. The bird piped, and Abú Ḥamza gave a shriek. Ḥárith rose up and seized a knife, crying, ” Thou art an infidel,” and would have killed him if the disciples had not separated them. Then he said to Abú Ḥamza : ” Become a Moslem, O miscreant ! ” The disciples exclaimed : ” O Shaykh, we all know him to be one of the elect saints and Unitarians : why does the Shaykh regard him with suspicion ? ” Ḥárith replied : ” I do not suspect him : his opinions are excellent, and I know that he is a profound Unitarian, but why should he do something which resembles the actions of those who believe in incarnation (ḥulúlíyán) and has the appearance of being derived from their doctrine? If a senseless bird pipes after its fashion, capriciously, why should he behave as though its note were the voice of God? God is indivisible, and the Eternal does not become incarnate, or united with phenomena or commingled with them.” When Abú Ḥamza perceived the Shaykh’s insight, he said: “O Shaykh, although I am right in theory, nevertheless, since my action resembled the actions of heretics, I repent and withdraw.”

May God keep my conduct above suspicion! But this is impossible when one associates with worldly formalists whose enmity is aroused by anyone who does not submit to their hypocrisy and sin.

2. THE QAṢṢÁRÍS.

They are the followers of Abú Ṣáliḥ Ḥamdún b. Aḥmad b. ʿUmára al-Qaṣṣár, a celebrated divine and eminent Ṣúfí. His doctrine was the manifestation and divulgation of “blame” (malámat). He used to say: “God’s knowledge of thee is better than men’s knowledge,” i.e. thy dealings with God in private should be better than thy dealings with men in public, for thy preoccupation with men is the greatest veil between thee and God. I have given some account of al-Qaṣṣár in the chapter on “Blame”. He relates the following story: “One day, while I was walking in the river-bed in the Ḥíra quarter of Níshápúr, I met Núḥ, a brigand famous for his generosity, who was the captain of all the brigands of Níshápúr. I said to him, ‘O Núḥ, what is generosity?’ He replied, ‘My generosity or yours?’ I said, ‘Describe both.’ He replied: ‘I put off the coat (qabá) and wear a patched frock and practise the conduct appropriate to that garment, in order that I may become a Ṣúfí and refrain from sin because of the shame that I feel before God; but you put off the patched frock in order that you may not be deceived by men, and that men may not be deceived by thee: accordingly, my generosity is formal observance of the religious law, while your generosity is spiritual observance of the Truth.’” This is a very sound principle.

3. THE ṬAYFÚRÍS.

They are the followers of Abú Yazíd Ṭayfúr b. ʿÍsá b. Surúshán al-Bisṭámí, a great and eminent Ṣúfí. His doctrine is rapture (ghalabat) and intoxication (sukr). Rapturous longing for God and intoxication of love cannot be acquired by human beings, and it is idle to claim, and absurd to imitate, anything that lies beyond the range of acquisition. Intoxication is not an attribute of the sober, and Man has no power of drawing it to himself. The intoxicated man is enraptured and pays no heed to created things, that he should manifest any quality involving conscious effort (taklíf). The Ṣúfí Shaykhs are agreed that no one is a proper model for others unless he is steadfast (mustaqím) and has escaped from the circle of “states”; but there are some who allow that the way of rapture and intoxication may be trodden with effort, because the Apostle said : “Weep, or else make as though ye wept!” Now, to imitate others for the sake of ostentation is sheer polytheism, but it is different when the object of the imitator is that God may perchance raise him to the rank of those whom he has imitated, in accordance with the saying of the Apostle: “Whoever makes himself like unto a people is one of them.” And one of the Shaykhs said : “Contemplations (musháhadát) are the result of mortifications (mujáhadát).” My own view is that, although mortifications are always excellent, intoxication and rapture cannot be acquired at all ; hence they cannot be induced by mortifications, which in themselves never become a cause of intoxication. I will now set forth the different opinions of the Shaykhs concerning the true nature of intoxication (sukr) and sobriety (ṣaḥw), in order that difficulties may be removed.

Discourse on Intoxication and Sobriety.

You must know that “intoxication” and “rapture” are terms used by spiritualists to denote the rapture of love for God, while the term ” sobriety ” expresses the attainment of that which is desired. Some place the former above the latter, and some hold the latter to be superior. Abú Yazíd and his followers prefer intoxication to sobriety. They say that sobriety involves the fixity and equilibrium of human attributes, which are the greatest veil between God and Man, whereas intoxication involves the destruction of human attributes, like foresight and choice, and the annihilation of a man’s self-control in God, so that only those faculties survive in him that do not belong to the human genus ; and they are the most complete and perfect. Thus David was in the state of sobriety ; an act proceeded from him which God attributed to him and said, ” David killed Goliath ” (Kor. ii, 252): but our Apostle was in the state of intoxication ; an act proceeded from him which God attributed to Himself and said, ” Thou didst not throw, when thou threwest, but God threw ” (Kor. viii, 17). How great is the difference between these two men ! The attribution of a man’s act to God is better than the attribution of God’s act to a man, for in the latter case the man stands by himself, while in the former case he stands through God.

Junayd and his followers prefer sobriety to intoxication. They say that intoxication is evil, because it involves the disturbance of one’s normal state and loss of sanity and self-control ; and inasmuch as the principle of all things is sought either by way of annihilation or subsistence, or of effacement or affirmation, the principle of verification cannot be attained unless the seeker is sane. Blindness will never release anyone from the bondage and corruption of phenomena. The fact that people remain in phenomena and forget God is due to their not seeing things as they really are ; for if they saw, they would escape. Seeing is of two kinds : he who looks at anything sees it either with the eye of subsistence (baqá) or with the eye of annihilation (fariá). If with the eye of subsistence, he perceives that the whole universe is imperfect in comparison with his own subsistence, for he does not regard phenomena as self-subsistent ; and if he looks with the eye of annihilation, he perceives that all created things are non-existent beside the subsistence of God. In either case he turns away from created things. On this account the Apostle said in his prayer : ” O God, show us things as they are,” because whoever thus sees them finds rest. Now, such vision cannot be properly attained except in the state of sobriety, and the intoxicated have no knowledge thereof. For example, Moses was intoxicated ; he could not endure the manifestation of one epiphany, but fell in a swoon (Kor. vii, 139) : but our Apostle was sober ; he beheld the same glory continuously, with ever-increasing consciousness, all the way from Mecca, until he stood at the space of two bow-lengths from the Divine presence (Kor. liii, 9).

My Shaykh, who followed the doctrine of Junayd, used to say that intoxication is the playground of children, but sobriety is the death-field of men. I say, in agreement with my Shaykh, that the perfection of the state of the intoxicated man is sobriety. The lowest stage in sobriety consists in regarding the powerlessness of humanity : therefore, a sobriety that appears to be evil is better than an intoxication that is really evil. It is related that Abú ʿUthmán Maghribí, in the earlier part of his life, passed twenty years in retirement, living in deserts where he never heard the sound of a human voice, until his frame was wasted and his eyes became as small as the eye of a sack-needle. After twenty years he was commanded to associate with mankind. He resolved to begin with the people of God who dwelt beside His Temple, since by doing so he would gain a greater blessing. The Shaykhs of Mecca were aware of his coming and went forth to meet him. Finding him so changed that he hardly seemed to be a human creature, they said to him : ” O Abú ʿUthmán, tell us why you went and what you saw and what you gained and wherefore you have come back.” He replied : ” I went because of intoxication, and I saw the evil of intoxication, and I gained despair, and I have come back on account of weakness.” All the Shaykhs said : ” O Abú ʿUthmán, it is not lawful for anyone after you to explain the meaning of sobriety and intoxication, for you have done justice to the whole matter and have shown forth the evil of intoxication.”

Intoxication, then, is to fancy one’s self annihilated while the attributes really subsist ; and this is a veil. Sobriety, on the other hand, is the vision of subsistence while the attributes are annihilated ; and this is actual revelation. It is absurd for anyone to suppose that intoxication is nearer to annihilation than sobriety is, for intoxication is a quality that exceeds sobriety, and so long as a man’s attributes tend to increase he is without knowledge ; but when he begins to diminish them, seekers (of God) have some hope of him.

It is related that Yaḥyá b. Muʿádh wrote to Abú Yazíd : ” What do you say of one who drinks a single drop of the ocean of love and becomes intoxicated ? ” Báyazíd wrote in reply : ” What do you say of one who, if all the oceans in the world were filled with the wine of love, would drink them all and still cry for more to slake his thirst ? ” People imagine that Yaḥyá was speaking of intoxication, and Báyazíd of sobriety, but the opposite is the case. The man of sobriety is he who is unable to drink even one drop, and the man of intoxication is he who drinks all and still desires more. Wine being the instrument of intoxication, but the enemy of sobriety, intoxication demands what is homogeneous with itself, whereas sobriety takes no pleasure in drinking.

There are two kinds of intoxication : (1) with the wine of affection (mawaddat) and (2) with the cup of love (maḥabbat). The former is ” caused ” (maʿlúl), since it arises from regarding the benefit (niʿmat) ; but the latter has no cause, since it arises from regarding the benefactor (munʿim). He who regards the benefit sees through himself and therefore sees himself, but he who regards the benefactor sees through Him and therefore does not see himself, so that, although he is intoxicated, his intoxication is sobriety.

Sobriety also is of two kinds : sobriety in heedlessness (ghaflat) and sobriety in love (maḥabbat). The former is the greatest of veils, but the latter is the clearest of revelations.

The sobriety that is connected with heedlessness is really intoxication, while that which is linked with love, although it be intoxication, is really sobriety. When the principle (aṣl) is firmly established, sobriety and intoxication resemble one another, but when the principle is wanting, both are baseless. In short, where true mystics tread, sobriety and intoxication are the effect of difference (ikhtiláf), and when the Sultan of Truth displays his beauty, both sobriety and intoxication appear to be intruders (ṭufaylí), because the boundaries of both are joined, and the end of the one is the beginning of the other, and beginning and end are terms that imply separation, which has only a relative existence. In union all separations are negated, as the poet says—

” When the morning-star of wine rises, The drunken and the sober are as one.”

At Sarakhs there were two spiritual directors, namely, Luqmán and Abú ‘l-Faḍl Ḥasan. One day Luqmán came to Abú ‘l-Faḍl and found him with a piece (of manuscript) in his hand. He said: “O Abú ‘l-Faḍl, what are you seeking in this paper?” Abú ‘l-Faḍl replied: “The same thing as you are seeking without a paper.” Luqmán said: “Then why this difference?” Abú ‘l-Faḍl answered: “You see a difference when you ask me what I am seeking. Become sober from intoxication and get rid of sobriety, in order that the difference may be removed from you and that you may know what you and I are in search of.”

The Ṭayfúrís and Junaydís are at variance to the extent which has been indicated. As regards ethics, the doctrine of Báyazíd consists in shunning companionship and choosing retirement from the world, and he enjoined all his disciples to do the same. This is a praiseworthy and laudable Path.

4. THE JUNAYDÍS.

They are the followers of Abú ‘l-Qásim al-Junayd b. Muḥammad, who in his time was called the Peacock of the Divines (Ṭáʾús al-ʿUlamá). He is the chief of this sect and the Imám of their Imáms. His doctrine is based on sobriety and is opposed to that of the Ṭayfúrís, as has been explained. It is the best known and most celebrated of all doctrines, and all the Shaykhs have adopted it, notwithstanding that there is much difference in their sayings on the ethics of Ṣúfiism. Want of space forbids me to discuss it further in this book : those who wish to become better acquainted with it must seek information elsewhere.

I have read in the Anecdotes that when Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) in his rapture broke off all relations with ʿAmr b. ʿUthmán (al-Makkí) and came to Junayd, Junayd asked him for what purpose he had come to him. Ḥusayn said : “For the purpose of associating with the Shaykh.” Junayd replied : “I do not associate with madmen. Association demands sanity ; if that is wanting, the result is such behaviour as yours in regard to Sahl b. ʿAbdalláh Tustarí and ʿAmr.” Ḥusayn said : “O Shaykh, sobriety and intoxication are two attributes of Man, and Man is veiled from his Lord until his attributes are annihilated.” “O son of Manṣúr,” said Junayd, “you are in error concerning sobriety and intoxication. The former denotes soundness of one’s spiritual state in relation to God, while the latter denotes excess of longing and extremity of love, and neither of them can be acquired by human effort. O son of Manṣúr, in your words I see much foolishness and nonsense.”

5. THE NÚRÍS.

They are the followers of Abú ‘l-Ḥasan Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Núrí, one of the most eminent and illustrious Ṣúfí divines. The principle of his doctrine is to regard Ṣúfiism (taṣawwuf) as superior to poverty (faqr). In matters of conduct he agrees with Junayd. It is a peculiarity of his “path” that in companionship (ṣuḥbat) he prefers his companion’s claim to his own, and holds companionship without preference (íthár) to be unlawful. He also holds that companionship is obligatory on dervishes, and that retirement (ʿuzlat) is not praiseworthy, and that everyone is bound to prefer his companion to himself. It is related that he said : ” Beware of retirement ! for it is in connexion with Satan ; and cleave to companionship, for therein is the satisfaction of the Merciful God.”

Now I will explain the true nature of preference, and when I come to the chapter on companionship and retirement I will set forth the mysteries of the subject in order to make it more generally instructive.

Discourse on Preference (íthár).

God said : “And they prefer them to themselves, although they are indigent ” (Kor. lix, 9). This verse was revealed concerning the poor men among the Companions in particular. The true nature of preference consists in maintaining the rights of the person with whom one associates, and in subordinating one’s own interest to the interest of one’s friend, and in taking trouble upon one’s self for the sake of promoting his happiness, because preference is the rendering of help to others, and the putting into practice of that which God commanded to His Apostle : ” Use indulgence and command what is just and turn away from the ignorant” (Kor. vii, 198). This will be explained more fully in the chapter on the rules of companionship.

Now, preference is of two kinds : firstly, in companionship, as has been mentioned ; and secondly, in love. In preferring the claim of one’s companion there is a sort of trouble and effort, but in preferring the claim of one’s beloved there is nothing but pleasure and delight. It is well known that when Ghulám al-Khalíl persecuted the Súfís, Núrí and Raqqám and Abú Ḥamza were arrested and conveyed to the Caliph’s palace. Ghulám al-Khalíl urged the Caliph to put them to death, saying that they were heretics (zanádiqa), and the Caliph immediately gave orders for their execution. When the executioner approached Raqqám, Núrí rose and offered himself in Raqqám’s place with the utmost cheerfulness and submission. All the spectators were astounded. The executioner said : “O young man, the sword is not a thing that people desire to meet so eagerly as you have welcomed it ; and your turn has not yet arrived.” Núrí answered : “ Yes ; my doctrine is founded on preference. Life is the most precious thing in the world : I wish to sacrifice for my brethren’s sake the few moments that remain. In my opinion, one moment of this world is better than a thousand years of the next world, because this is the place of service (khidmat) and that is the place of proximity (qurbat), and proximity is gained by service.” The tenderness of Núrí and the fineness of his saying astonished the Caliph (who was informed by a courier of what had passed) to such a degree, that he suspended the execution of the three Ṣúfís and charged the chief Cadi, Abú ’l-ʿAbbás b. ʿAlí, to inquire into the matter. The Cadi, having taken them to his house and questioned them concerning the ordinances of the Law and the Truth, found them perfect, and felt remorse for his indifference to their fate. Then Núrí said : “ O Cadi, though you have asked all these questions, you have not yet asked anything to the point, for God has servants who eat through Him, and drink through Him, and sit through Him, and live through Him, and abide in contemplation of Him : if they were cut off from contemplating Him they would cry out in anguish.” The Cadi was amazed at the subtlety of his speech and the soundness of his state. He wrote to the Caliph : “ If the Ṣúfís are heretics, who in the world is a Unitarian ? ” The Caliph called them to his presence and said : “ Ask a boon.” They replied : “ The only boon we ask of thee is that thou shouldst forget us, and neither make us thy favourites nor banish us from thy court, for thy favour and displeasure are alike to us.” The Caliph wept and dismissed them with honour.

It is related that Náfiʿ[^p215-1] said : “ Ibn ʿUmar[^p215-2] desired to eat a fish. I sought through the town, but did not find one until several days had passed. Having procured it, I gave orders that it should be placed on a cake of bread and presented it to him. I noticed an expression of joy on his face as he received it, but suddenly a beggar came to the door of his house and he ordered the fish to be given to him. The servant said : ‘O master, you have been desiring a fish for several days ; let us give the beggar something else.’ Ibn ʿUmar replied : ‘This fish is unlawful to me, for I have put it out of my mind on account of a Tradition which I heard from the Apostle : Whenever anyone feels a desire and repels it and prefers another to himself, he shall be forgiven.’”

I have read in the Anecdotes that ten dervishes lost their way in the desert and were overtaken by thirst. They had only one cup of water, and everyone preferred the claim of the others, so that none of them would drink and they all died except one, who then drank it and found strength to escape. Some person said to him : “Had you not drunk, it would have been better.” He replied : “The Law obliged me to drink ; if I had not, I should have killed myself and been punished on that account.” The other said : “Then did your friends kill themselves ?” “No,” said the dervish ; “they refused to drink in order that their companions might drink, but when I alone survived I was legally obliged to drink.”[^p216-1]

Among the Israelites there was a devotee who had served God for four hundred years. One day he said : “O Lord, if Thou hadst not created these mountains, wandering for religion’s sake (siyáḥat) would have been easier for Thy servants.” The Divine command came to the Apostle of that time to say to the devotee : “What business have you to interfere in My kingdom ? Now, since you have interfered, I blot your name from the register of the blest and inscribe it in the register of the damned.” On hearing this, the devotee trembled with joy and bowed to the ground in thanksgiving. The Apostle said : ” O fool, it is not necessary to bow down in thanksgiving for damnation.” ” My thanksgiving,” the devotee replied : ” is not for damnation, but because my name is at least inscribed in one of His registers. But, O Apostle, I have a boon to ask. Say unto God, ʿSince Thou wilt send me to Hell, make me so large that I may take the place of all sinful Unitarians, and let them go to Paradise.ʾ ” God commanded the Apostle to tell the devotee that the probation which he had undergone was not for the purpose of humiliating him, but to reveal him to the people, and that on the Day of Resurrection both he and those for whom he had interceded would be in Paradise.

I asked Aḥmad Ḥammádí of Sarakhs what was the beginning of his conversion. He replied : ” Once I set out from Sarakhs and took my camels into the desert and stayed there for a considerable time. I was always wishing to be hungry and was giving my portion of food to others, and the words of God— ” They prefer them to themselves, although they are indigent ” (Kor. lix, 9)—were ever fresh in my mind ; and I had a firm belief in the Ṣúfís. One day a hungry lion came from the desert and killed one of my camels and retired to some rising ground and roared. All the wild beasts in the neighbourhood, hearing him roar, gathered round him. He tore the camel to pieces and went back to the higher ground without having eaten anything. The other beasts—foxes, jackals, wolves, etc.— began to eat, and the lion waited until they had gone away. Then he approached in order to eat a morsel, but seeing a lame fox in the distance he withdrew once more until the new-comer had eaten his fill. After that, he came and ate a morsel. As he departed he spoke to me, who had been watching from afar, and said: ʿO Aḥmad, to prefer others to one’s self in the matter of food is an act only worthy of dogs : a man sacrifices his life and his soul.ʾ When I saw this evidence I renounced all worldly occupations, and that was the beginning of my conversion.”

Jaʿfar Khuldí says: ” One day, when Abu ‘l-Ḥasan Núrí was praying to God in solitude I went to overhear him, for he was very eloquent. He was saying, ‘O Lord, in Thy eternal knowledge and power and will Thou dost punish the people of Hell, whom Thou hast created ; and if it be Thy inexorable will to make Hell full of mankind, Thou art able to fill that Hell and all its limbos with me alone and to send them to Paradise.’ I was amazed by his speech, but I dreamed that some one came to me and said: ‘God bids thee tell Abu ‘l-Ḥasan that he has been forgiven on account of his compassion for God’s creatures and his reverence for God.’”

He was called Núrí because when he spoke in a dark room the whole room was illuminated by the light (núr) of his spirituality. And by the light of the Truth he used to read the inmost thoughts of his disciples, so that Junayd said : “Abú ‘l-Ḥasan is the spy on men’s hearts (jásús al-qulúb).”

This is his peculiar doctrine. It is a sound principle, and one of great importance in the eyes of those who have insight. Nothing is harder to a man than spiritual sacrifice (badhl-i rúḥ) and to refrain from the object of his love, and God hath made this sacrifice the key of all good, as He said : “Ye shall never attain to righteousness until ye give in alms of that which ye love” (Kor. iii, 86). When a man’s spirit is sacrificed, of what value are his wealth and his health and his frock and his food? This is the foundation of Ṣúfíism. Some one came to Ruwaym and asked him for direction. Ruwaym said : “O my son, the whole affair consists in spiritual sacrifice. If you are able for this, it is well ; if not, do not occupy yourself with the futilities (turrahát) of the Ṣúfís,” i.e. all except this is futile ; and God said : “Do not call dead those who are slain in the way of God. Nay, they are living” (Kor. ii, 149). Eternal life is gained by spiritual sacrifice and by renunciation of self-interest in fulfilling God’s commandment and by obedience to His friends. But from the standpoint of gnosis (maʿrifat) preference and free choice are separation (tafriqat), and real preference consists in union with God, for the true basis of self-interest is self-abandonment. So long as the seeker’s progress is connected with acquisition (kasb) it is pernicious, but when the attracting influence (jadhb) of the Truth manifests its dominion all his actions are confounded, and he loses all power of expression ; nor can any name be applied to him or any description be given of him or anything be imputed to him. On this subject Shiblí says in verse—

“I am lost to myself and unconscious, And my attributes are annihilated. To-day I am lost to all things: Naught remains but a forced expression.”

6. The Sahlís.

They are the followers of Sahl b. ʿAbdállah of Tustar, a great and venerable Ṣúfí, who has been already mentioned. His doctrine inculcates endeavour and self-mortification and ascetic training, and he used to bring his disciples to perfection in self-mortification (mujáhadat). It is related in a well-known anecdote that he said to one of his disciples : “Strive to say continuously for one day, ‘O Allah ! O Allah ! O Allah !’ and do the same next day and the day after that,” until he became habituated to saying those words. Then he bade him repeat them at night also, until they became so familiar that he uttered them even during his sleep. Then he said : “Do not repeat them any more, but let all your faculties be engrossed in remembering God.” The disciple did this, until he became absorbed in the thought of God. One day, when he was in his house, a piece of wood fell on his head and broke it. The drops of blood which trickled to the ground bore the legend “Allah ! Allah ! Allah !”

The “path” of the Sahlís is to educate disciples by acts of self-mortification and austerities; that of the Ḥamdúnís[^p219-1] is to serve and reverence dervishes ; and that of the Junaydís is to keep watch over one’s spiritual state (muráqaba-i báṭin).

The object of all austerities and acts of self-mortification is resistance to the lower soul (nafs), and until a man knows his lower soul his austerities are of no use to him. Now, therefore, I will explain the knowledge and true nature of the lower soul, and in the next place I will lay down the doctrine concerning self-mortification and its principles.

Discourse touching the true nature of the Lower Soul (nafs) and the meaning of Passion (hawá).

You must know that nafs, etymologically, is the essence and reality of anything, but in popular language it is used to denote many contradictory meanings, e.g. “spirit”, “virility” (muruwwat), “body”, and “blood”. The mystics of this sect, however, are agreed that it is the source and principle of evil, but while some assert that it is a substance (ʿayn) located in the body, as the spirit (rúḥ) is, others hold it to be an attribute of the body, as life is. But they all agree that through it base qualities are manifested and that it is the immediate cause of blameworthy actions. Such actions are of two kinds, namely, sins (maʿáṣí) and base qualities (akhláq-i daní), like pride, envy, avarice, anger, hatred, etc., which are not commendable in law and reason. These qualities can be removed by discipline (riyáḍat): e.g., sins are removed by repentance. Sins belong to the class of external attributes, whereas the qualities above mentioned belong to the class of internal attributes. Similarly, discipline is an external act, and repentance is an internal attribute. A base quality that appears within is purged by excellent outward attributes, and one that appears without is purged by laudable inward attributes. Both the lower soul and the spirit are subtle things (laṭáʾif) existing in the body, just as devils and angels and Paradise and Hell exist in the universe; but the one is the seat of good, while the other is the seat of evil. Hence, resistance to the lower soul is the chief of all acts of devotion and the crown of all acts of self-mortification, and only thereby can Man find the way to God, because submission to the lower soul involves his destruction and resistance to it involves his salvation.[^p221-1]

Now, every attribute needs an object whereby it subsists, and knowledge of that attribute, namely, the soul, is not attained save by knowledge of the whole body, which knowledge in turn demands an explanation of the qualities of human nature (insániyyat) and the mystery thereof, and is incumbent upon all seekers of the Truth, because whoever is ignorant of himself is yet more ignorant of other things ; and inasmuch as a man is bound to know God, he must first know himself, in order that by rightly perceiving his own temporality he may recognize the eternity of God, and may learn the everlastingness of God through his own perishableness. The Apostle said : ” He who knows himself already knows his Lord,” i.e., if he knows himself as perishable he knows God as everlasting, or if he knows himself as humble he knows God as Almighty, or if he knows himself as a servant he knows God as the Lord. Therefore one who does not know himself is debarred from knowledge of all things.

As regards the knowledge of human nature and the various opinions held on that topic, some Moslems assert that Man is nothing but spirit (rúḥ), of which this body is the cuirass and temple and residence, in order to preserve it from being injured by the natural humours (ṭabáyiʿ), and of which the attributes are sensation and intelligence. This view is false, because a body from which the soul (ján) has departed is still called “a human being” (insán) ; if the soul is joined with it it is ” a live human being”, and if the soul is gone it is ” a dead human being ”. Moreover, a soul is located in the bodies of animals, yet they are not called “human beings”. If the spirit (rúḥ) were the cause of human nature, it would follow that the principle of human nature must exist in every creature possessed of a soul (ján-dárí) ; which is a proof of the falsity of their assertion. Others, again, have stated that the term “human nature” is applicable to the spirit and the body together, and that it no longer applies when one is separated from the other ; e.g., when two colours, black and white, are combined on a horse, it is called ” piebald ” (ablaq), whereas the same colours, apart from each other, are called ” black ” and ” white ”. This too is false, in accordance with God’s word : ” Did there not come over Man a space of time during which he was not a thing worthy of mention?” (Kor. lxxvi, 1) : in this verse Man’s clay, without soul—for the soul had not yet been joined to his body—is called ” Man ”. Others aver that ” Man ” is an atom, centred in the heart, which is the principle of all human attributes. This also is absurd, for if anyone is killed and his heart is taken out of his body he does not lose the name of ” human being ” ; moreover, it is agreed that the heart was not in the human body before the soul. Some pretenders to Súfiism have fallen into error on this subject. They declare that ” Man ” is not that which eats and drinks and suffers decay, but a Divine mystery, of which this body is the vesture, situated in the interfusion of the natural humours (imtizáj-i ṭab) and in the union (ittiḥád) of body and spirit. To this I reply, that by universal consent the name of ” human being” belongs to sane men and mad, and to infidels and immoral and ignorant persons, in whom there is no such ” mystery ” and who suffer decay and eat and drink ; and that there is not anything called ” Man ” in the body, either while it exists or after it has ceased to exist. God Almighty has given the name of ” Man ” to the sum of the substances which He compounded in us, excluding those things which are not to be found in some human beings, e.g. in the verses ” And We have created Man of the choicest clay,” etc. (Kor. xxiii, 12-14). Therefore, according to the word of God, who is the most veracious of all who speak the Truth, this particular form, with all its ingredients and with all the changes which it undergoes, is ” Man ”. In like manner, certain Sunnís have said that Man is a living creature whose form has these characteristics, and that death does not deprive him of this name, and that he is endowed with a definite physiognomy (ṣúrat-i naḳdid) and a distinct organ (álat-i mawsúm) both externally and internally. By ” a definite physiognomy ” they mean that he has either good or ill health, and by ” a distinct organ ” that he is either mad or sane. It is generally allowed that the more sound (ṣaḥíḥ) a thing is, the more perfect it is in constitution. You must know, then, that in the opinion of mystics the most perfect composition of Man includes three elements, viz. spirit, soul, and body ; and that each of these has an attribute which subsists therein, the attribute of spirit being intelligence, of soul, passion, and of body, sensation. Man is a type of the whole universe. The universe is the name of the two worlds, and in Man there is a vestige of both, for he is composed of phlegm, blood, bile, and melancholy, which four humours correspond to the four elements of this world, viz. water, earth, air, and fire, while his soul (ján), his lower soul (nafs), and his body correspond to Paradise, Hell, and the place of Resurrection. Paradise is the effect of God’s satisfaction, and Hell is the result of His anger. Similarly, the spirit of the true believer reflects the peace of knowledge, and his lower soul the error which veils him from God. As, at the Resurrection, the believer must be released from Hell before he can reach Paradise and attain to real vision and pure love, so in this world he must escape from his lower soul before he can attain to real discipleship (irádat), of which the spirit is the principle, and to real proximity (to God) and gnosis. Hence, whoever knows Him in this world and turns away from all besides and follows the highway of the sacred law, at the Resurrection he will not see Hell and the Bridge (Ṣiráṭ). In short, the believer’s spirit calls him to Paradise, of which it is a type in this world, and his lower soul calls him to Hell, of which it is a type in this world. Therefore it behoves those who seek God never to relax their resistance to the lower soul, in order that thereby they may reinforce the spirit and the intelligence, which are the home of the Divine mystery.

SECTION.

As regards what has been said by the Shaykhs concerning the lower soul, Dhu ‘l-Nún the Egyptian says: “Vision of the lower soul and its promptings is the worst of veils,” because obedience to it is disobedience to God, which is the origin of all veils. Abú Yazíd Bisṭámí says: “The lower soul is an attribute which never rests save in falsehood,” i.e. it never seeks the Truth. Muḥammad b. ʿAlí al-Tirmidhí says: “You wish to know God while your lower soul subsists in you; but your lower soul does not know itself, how should it know another?” Junayd says: “To fulfil the desires of your lower soul is the foundation of infidelity,” because the lower soul is not connected with, and is always striving to turn away from, the pure truth of Islam; and he who turns away denies, and he who denies is an alien (bégána). Abú Sulaymán Dárání says: “The lower soul is treacherous and hindering (one who seeks to please God); and resistance to it is the best of actions.”

Now I come to my main purpose, which is to set forth the doctrine of Sahl concerning the mortification and discipline of the lower soul, and to explain its true nature.

Discourse on the Mortification of the Lower Soul.

God has said: “Those who strive to the utmost (jáhadú) for Our sake, We will guide them into Our ways” (Kor. xxix, 69). And the Prophet said: “The (mujáhid) is he who struggles with all his might against himself (jáhada nafsahu) for God’s sake.” And he also said: “We have returned from the lesser war (al-jihád al-aṣghar) to the greater war (al-jihád al-akbar).” On being asked, “What is the greater war?” he replied, “It is the struggle against one’s self” (mujáhadat al-nafs). Thus the Apostle adjudged the mortification of the lower soul to be superior to the Holy War against unbelievers, because the former is more painful. You must know, then, that the way of mortification is plain and manifest, for it is approved by men of all religions and sects, and is observed and practised by the Ṣúfís in particular; and the term “mortification” (mujáhadat) is current among Ṣúfís of every class, and the Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on this topic. Sahl b. ʿAbdalláh Tustarí carries the principle to an extreme point. It is related that he used to break his fast only once in fifteen days, and he ate but little food in the course of his long life. While all mystics have affirmed the need of mortification, and have declared it to be an indirect means (asbáb) of attaining contemplation (musháhadat), Sahl asserted that mortification is the direct cause (ʿillat) of the latter, and he attributed to search (ṭalab) a powerful effect on attainment (yáft), so that he even regarded the present life, spent in search, as superior to the future life of fruition. “If,” he said, “you serve God in this world, you will attain proximity to Him in the next world : without that service there would not be this proximity : it follows that self-mortification, practised with the aid of God, is the direct cause of union with God.” Others, on the contrary, hold that there is no direct cause of union with God, and whoever attains to God does so by Divine grace (faḍl), which is independent of human actions. Therefore, they argue, the object of mortification is to correct the vices of the lower soul, not to attain real proximity, and inasmuch as mortification is referred to Man, while contemplation is referred to God, it is impossible that one should be caused by the other. Sahl, however, cites in favour of his view the words of God : ” Those who strive to the utmost for Our sake, We will guide them into Our ways ” (Kor. xxix, 69), i.e. whoever mortifies himself will attain to contemplation. Furthermore, he contends that inasmuch as the books revealed to the Prophets, and the Sacred Law, and all the religious ordinances imposed on mankind involve mortification, they must all be false and vain if mortification were not the cause of contemplation. Again, both in this world and the next, everything is connected with principles and causes. If it is maintained that principles have no causes, there is an end of all law and order : neither can religious obligations be justified nor will food be the cause of repletion and clothes the cause of warmth. Accordingly, to regard actions as being caused is Unification (tawḥíd), and to rebut this is Nullification (taʿṭíl). He who asserts it is proving the existence of contemplation, and he who denies it is denying the existence of contemplation. Does not training (riyáḍat) alter the animal qualities of a wild horse and substitute human qualities in their stead, so that he will pick up a whip from the ground and give it to his master, or will roll a ball with his foot ? In the same way, a boy without sense and of foreign race is taught by training to speak Arabic, and take a new language in exchange for his mother tongue; and a savage beast is trained to go away when leave is given to it, and to come back when it is called, preferring captivity to freedom.[^p226-1] Therefore, Sahl and his followers argue, mortification is just as necessary for the attainment of union with God as diction and composition are necessary for the elucidation of ideas ; and as one is led to knowledge of the Creator by assurance that the universe was created in time, so one is led to union with God by knowledge and mortification of the lower soul.

I will now state the arguments of the opposing party. They maintain that the verse of the Koran (xxix, 69) cited by Sahl is a hysteron proteron, and that the meaning of it is, ” Those whom We guide into Our ways strive to the utmost for Our sake.” And the Apostle said : ” Not one of you shall be saved by his works.” ” O Apostle,” they cried, ” not even thou ? ” ” Not even I,” he said, ” unless God encompass me with His mercy.” Now, mortification is a man’s act, and his act cannot possibly become the cause of his salvation, which depends on the Divine Will, as God hath said : ” Whomsoever God wishes to lead aright, He will open his breast to receive Islam, but whomsoever He wishes to lead astray, He will make his breast strait and narrow” (Kor. vi, 125). By affirming His will, He denies the (effect of the) religious ordinances which have been laid upon mankind. If mortification were the cause of union Iblís would not have been damned, or if neglect of mortification were the cause of damnation Adam would never have been blessed. The result hangs on predestined grace (ʿináyat), not on abundance of mortification. It is not the case that he who most exerts himself is the most secure, but that he who has most grace is nearest to God. A monk worshipping in his cell may be far from God, and a sinner in the tavern may be near to Him. The noblest thing in the world is the faith of a child who is not subject to the religious law (mukallaf) and in this respect belongs to the same category as madmen : if, then, mortification is not the cause of the noblest of all gifts, no cause is necessary for anything that is inferior.

I, ʿAlí b. ʿUthmán al-Jullábí, say that the difference between the two parties in this controversy lies in expression (ʿibárat). One says, ” He who seeks shall find,” and the other says, ” He who finds shall seek.” Seeking is the cause of finding, but it is no less true that finding is the cause of seeking. The one party practises mortification for the purpose of attaining contemplation, and the other party practises contemplation for the purpose of attaining mortification. The fact is that mortification stands in the same relation to contemplation as Divine blessing (tawfíq), which is a gift from God, to obedience (ṭáʿat) : as it is absurd to seek obedience without Divine blessing, so it is absurd to seek Divine blessing without obedience, and as there can be no mortification without contemplation, so there can be no contemplation without mortification. Man is guided to mortification by a flash of the Divine Beauty, and inasmuch as that flash is the cause of the existence of mortification, Divine guidance (hidáyat) precedes mortification.

Now, as regards the argument of Sahl and his followers that failure to affirm mortification involves the denial of all the religious ordinances which have come down in the books revealed to the Prophets, this statement requires correction. Religious obligations (taklíf) depend on Divine guidance (hidáyat), and acts of mortification only serve to affirm the proofs of God, not to effect real union with Him. God has said : “And though We had sent down the angels unto them and the dead had spoken unto them and We had gathered before them all things together, they would not have believed unless God had so willed” (Kor. vi, 111), for the cause of belief is Our will, not evidences or mortification. Accordingly, the revelations of the Prophets and the ordinances of religion are a means (asbáb) of attaining to union, but are not the cause (ʿillat) of union. So far as religious obligations are concerned, Abú Bakr was in the same position as Abú Jahl, but Abú Bakr, having justice and grace, attained, whereas Abú Jahl, having justice without grace, failed. Therefore the cause of attainment is attainment itself, not the act of seeking attainment, for if the seeker were one with the object sought the seeker would be one, and in that case he would not be a seeker, because he who has attained is at rest, which the seeker cannot be.

Again, in reference to their argument that the qualities of a horse are altered by mortification, you must know that mortification is only a means of bringing out qualities that are already latent in the horse but do not appear until he has been trained. Mortification will never turn a donkey into a horse or a horse into a donkey, because this involves a change of identity ; and since mortification has not the power of transforming identity it cannot possibly be affirmed in the presence of God.

Over that spiritual director, namely, Sahl, there used to pass a mortification of which he was independent and which, while he was in the reality thereof, he was unable to express in words. He was not like some who have made it their religion to talk about mortification without practising it. How absurd that what ought to consist wholly in action should become nothing but words ! In short, the Ṣúfís are unanimous in recognizing the existence of mortification and discipline, but hold that it is wrong to pay regard to them. Those who deny mortification do not mean to deny its reality, but only to deny that any regard should be paid to it or that anyone should be pleased with his own actions in the place of holiness, inasmuch as mortification is the act of Man, while contemplation is a state in which one is kept by God, and a man’s actions do not begin to have value until God keeps him thus. The mortification of those whom God loves is the work of God in them without choice on their part : it overwhelms and melts them away ; but the mortification of ignorant men is the work of themselves in themselves by their own choice: it perturbs and distresses them, and distress is due to evil. Therefore, do not speak of thine own actions while thou canst avoid it, and never in any circumstances follow thy lower soul, for it is thy phenomenal being that veils thee from God. If thou wert veiled by one act alone, thou mightest be unveiled by another, but since thy whole being is a veil thou wilt not become worthy of subsistence (baqá) until thou art wholly annihilated. It is related in a well-known anecdote that Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) came to Kúfa and lodged in the house of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-ʿAlawí. Ibráhím Khawwáṣ also came to Kúfa, and, having heard of al-Ḥalláj, went to see him. Al-Ḥalláj said: “O Ibráhím, during these forty years of your connexion with Ṣúfiism, what have you gained from it ? ” Ibráhím answered : ” I have made the doctrine of trust in God (tawakkul) peculiarly my own.” Al-Ḥalláj said : ” You have wasted your life in cultivating your spiritual nature : what has become of annihilation in Unification (al-faná fí ‘l-tawḥíd)?” i.e. “trust in God is a term denoting your conduct towards God and your spiritual excellence in regard to relying on Him : if a man spends his whole life in remedying his spiritual nature, he will need another life for remedying his material nature, and his life will be lost before he has found a trace or vestige of God ”. And a story is told of Shaykh Abú ʿAlí Siyáh of Merv, that he said: “I saw my lower soul in a form resembling my own, and some one had seized it by its hair and gave it into my hands. I bound it to a tree and was about to destroy it, when it cried out, ‘O Abú ʿAlí, do not trouble yourself. I am God’s army (lashkar-i khudáyam): you cannot reduce me to naught.’” And it is related concerning Muḥammad b. ʿUlyán of Nasá, an eminent companion of Junayd, that he said: “In my novitiate, when I had become aware of the corruptions of the lower soul and acquainted with its places of ambush, I always felt a violent hatred of it in my heart. One day something like a young fox came forth from my throat, and God caused me to know that it was my lower soul. I cast it under my feet, and at every kick that I gave it, it grew bigger. I said: ‘Other things are destroyed by pain and blows: why dost thou increase?’ It replied: ‘Because I was created perverse: that which is pain to other things is pleasure to me, and their pleasure is my pain.’” Shaykh Abú ’l-ʿAbbás Shaqání, who was the Imám of his time, said: “One day I came into my house and found a yellow dog lying there, asleep. Thinking it had come in from the street, I was about to turn it out. It crept under my skirt and vanished.” Shaykh Abú ’l-Qásim Gurgání, who to-day is the Quṭb—may God prolong his life!—relates, speaking of his novitiate, that he saw his lower soul in the form of a snake. A dervish said: “I saw my lower soul in the shape of a mouse. ‘Who art thou?’ I asked. It answered: ‘I am the destruction of the heedless, for I urge them to evil, and the salvation of those who love God, for if I were not with them in my corruption they would be puffed up with pride in their purity.’”

All these stories prove that the lower soul is a real substance (ʿayní), not a mere attribute, and that it has attributes which we clearly perceive. The Apostle said: “Thy worst enemy is thy lower soul, which is between thy two sides.” When you have obtained knowledge of it you recognize that it can be mastered by discipline, but that its essence and substance do not perish. If it is rightly known and under control, the seeker need not care though it continues to exist in him.

Hence the purpose of mortifying the lower soul is to destroy its attributes, not to annihilate its reality. Now I will discuss the true nature of passion and the renunciation of lusts.

Discourse on the true nature of Passion (hawá).

You must know that, according to the opinion of some, passion is a term applied to the attributes of the lower soul, but, according to others, a term denoting the natural volition (irádat-i ṭabʿí) whereby the lower soul is controlled and directed, just as the spirit is controlled by the intelligence. Every spirit that is devoid of the faculty of intelligence is imperfect, and similarly every lower soul that is devoid of the faculty of passion is imperfect. Man is continually being called by intelligence and passion into contrary ways. If he obeys the call of intelligence he attains to faith, but if he obeys the call of passion he arrives at error and infidelity. Therefore passion is a veil and a false guide, and man is commanded to resist it. Passion is of two kinds: (1) desire of pleasure and lust, and (2) desire of worldly honour and authority. He who follows pleasure and lust haunts taverns, and mankind are safe from his mischief, but he who desires honour and authority lives in cells (ṣawámiʿ) and monasteries, and not only has lost the right way himself but also leads others into error. One whose every act depends on passion, and who finds satisfaction in following it, is far from God although he be with you in a mosque, but one who has renounced and abandoned it is near to God although he be in a church. Ibráhím Khawwáṣ relates this anecdote : “Once I heard that in Rúm there was a monk who had been seventy years in a monastery. I said to myself: ‘Wonderful! Forty years is the term of monastic vows : what is the state of this man that he has remained there for seventy years ?’ I went to see him. When I approached, he opened a window and said to me : ‘O Ibráhím, I know why you have come. I have not stayed here for seventy years because of monastic vows, but I have a dog foul with passion, and I have taken my abode in this monastery for the purpose of guarding the dog (sagbáni), and preventing it from doing harm to others. On hearing him say this I exclaimed : “O Lord, Thou art able to bestow righteousness on a man even though he be involved in sheer error.” He said to me : “O Ibráhím, how long will you seek men ? Go and seek yourself, and when you have found yourself keep watch over yourself, for this passion clothes itself every day in three hundred and sixty diverse garments of godhead and leads men astray.’”

In short, the devil cannot enter a man’s heart until he desires to commit a sin : but when a certain quantity of passion appears, the devil takes it and decks it out and displays it to the man’s heart ; and this is called diabolic suggestion (waswás). It begins from passion, and in reference to this fact God said to Iblís when he threatened to seduce all mankind : “Verily, thou hast no power over My servants” (Kor. xv, 42), for the devil in reality is a man’s lower soul and passion. Hence the Apostle said : “There is no one whom his devil (i.e. his passion) has not subdued except ʿUmar, for he has subdued his devil.” Passion is mingled as an ingredient in the clay of Adam ; whoever renounces it becomes a prince and whoever follows it becomes a captive. Junayd was asked : “What is union with God ?” He replied : “To renounce passion,” for of all the acts of devotion by which God’s favour is sought none has greater value than resistance to passion, because it is easier for a man to destroy a mountain with his nails than to resist passion. I have read in the Anecdotes that Dhu ‘l-Nún the Egyptian said : “I saw a man flying through the air, and asked him how he had attained to this degree. He answered : ‘I set my feet on passion (hawá) in order that I might ascend into the air (hawá)!’” It is related that Muḥammad b. Faḍl al-Balkhí said : “I marvel at one who goes with his passion into God’s House and visits Him : why does not he trample on his passion that he may attain to Him ?”

The most manifest attribute of the lower soul is lust (shahwat).

Lust is a thing that is dispersed in different parts of the human body, and is served by the senses. Man is bound to guard all his members from it, and he shall be questioned concerning the acts of each. The lust of the eye is sight, that of the ear is hearing, that of the nose is smell, that of the tongue is speech, that of the palate is taste, that of the body (jasad) is touch, and that of the mind is thought (andíshídan). It behoves the seeker of God to spend his whole life, day and night, in ridding himself of these incitements to passion which show themselves through the senses, and to pray God to make him such that this desire will be removed from his inward nature, since whoever is afflicted with lust is veiled from all spiritual things. If anyone should repel it by his own exertions, his task would be long and painful. The right way is resignation (taslím). It is related that Abú ʿAlí Siyáh of Merv said : “I had gone to the bath and in accordance with the custom of the Prophet I was using a razor (pubis tondendæ causâ). I said to myself : ‘O Abú ʿAlí, amputate this member which is the source of all lusts and keeps thee afflicted with so much evil.’ A voice in my heart whispered : ‘O Abú ʿAlí, wilt thou interfere in My kingdom? Are not all thy limbs equally at My disposal ? If thou do this, I swear by My glory that I will put a hundredfold lust and passion in every hair in that place.’”

Although a man has no power over what is vicious in his constitution, he can get an attribute changed by Divine aid and by resigning himself to God’s will and by divesting himself of his own power and strength. In reality, when he resigns himself, God protects him ; and through God’s protection he comes nearer to annihilating the evil than he does through self-mortification, since flies are more easily driven away with an umbrella (mikanna) than with a fly-whisk (midhabba). Unless Divine protection is predestined to a man, he cannot abstain from anything by his own exertion, and unless God exerts Himself towards a man, that man’s exertion is of no use. All acts of exertion fall under two heads : their object is either to avert the predestination of God or to acquire something in spite of predestination ; and both these objects are impossible. It is related that when Shiblí was ill, the physician advised him to be abstinent. “From what shall I abstain?” said he, “from that which God bestows upon me, or from that which He does not bestow? It is impossible to abstain from the former, and the latter is not in my hands.” I will discuss this question carefully on another occasion.

7. THE ḤAKÍMÍS.

They are the followers of Abú ʿAbdalláh Muḥammad b. ʿAlí al-Ḥakím al-Tirmidhí, who was one of the religious leaders of his time and the author of many works on every branch of exoteric and esoteric science. His doctrine was based on saintship (wiláyat), and he used to explain the true nature of saintship and the degrees of the saints and the observance of the proper arrangement of their ranks.

As the first step towards understanding his doctrine, you must know that God has saints (awliyá), whom He has chosen out of mankind, and whose thoughts He has withdrawn from worldly ties and delivered from sensual temptations ; and He has stationed each of them in a particular degree, and has opened unto them the door of these mysteries. Much might be said on this topic, but I must briefly set forth several points of capital importance.

Discourse on the Affirmation of Saintship (wiláyat).

You must know that the principle and foundation of Súfiism and knowledge of God rests on saintship, the reality of which is unanimously affirmed by all the Shaykhs, though every one has expressed himself in different language. The peculiarity of Muḥammad b. ʿAlí (al-Ḥakím) lies in the fact that he applied this term to the theory of Súfiism.

Waláyat means, etymologically, “power to dispose” (taṣarruf), and wiláyat means “possession of command” (imárat). Waláyat also means “lordship” (rubúbiyyat) ; hence God hath said : “In this case the lordship (al-waláyat) belongs to God who is the Truth ” (Kor. xviii, 42), because the unbelievers seek His protection and turn unto Him and renounce their idols. And wiláyat also means ” love ” (maḥabbat). Walí may be the form faʿíl with the meaning of mafʿúl, as God hath said : ” And He takes charge of (yatawallá) the righteous ” (Kor. vii, 195), for God does not leave His servant to his own actions and attributes, but keeps him under His protection. And walí may be the form faʿíl, equivalent to fáʿil, with an intensive force, because a man takes care (tawallí kunad) to obey God and constantly to fulfil the obligations that he owes to Him. Thus walí in the active meaning is ” one who desires ” (muríd), while in the passive meaning it denotes ” one who is the object of God’s desire ” (murád). All these meanings, whether they signify the relation of God to Man or that of Man to God, are allowable, for God may be the protector of His friends, inasmuch as He promised His protection to the Companions of the Apostle, and declared that the unbelievers had no protector (mawlá).[^p235-1] And, moreover, He may distinguish them in an exclusive way by His friendship, as He hath said, ” He loves them and they love Him ” (Kor. v, 59), so that they turn away from the favour of mankind : He is their friend (walí) and they are His friends (awliyá). And He may confer on one a ” friendship ” (wiláyat) that enables him to persevere in obedience to Him, and keeps him free from sin, and on another a ” friendship ” that empowers him to loose and bind, and makes his prayers answered and his aspirations effectual, as the Apostle said : ” There is many a one with dirty hair, dust-stained, clad in two old garments, whom men never heed ; but if he were to swear by God, God would verify his oath.” It is well known that in the Caliphate of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭáb, the Nile, in accordance with its usual habit, ceased to flow ; for in the time of Paganism they used annually to adorn a maiden and throw her into the river to make it flow again. ʿUmar therefore wrote on a piece of paper : ” O river, if thou hast stopped of thy own will, thou doest wrong, and if by command of God, ʿUmar bids thee flow.” When this paper was thrown in, the Nile resumed its course.

My purpose in discussing saintship and affirming its reality is to show you that the name of saint (walí) is properly applied to those in whom the above-mentioned qualities are actually present (ḥál) and not merely reputed (qál). Certain Shaykhs formerly composed books on this subject, but they became rare and soon disappeared. Now I will commend to you the explanation given by that venerable spiritual director who is the author of the doctrine—for my own belief in it is greater—in order that much instruction may be gained, not only by yourself, but also by every seeker of Ṣúfiism who may have the good fortune to read this book.

SECTION.

You must know that the word walí is current among the vulgar, and is to be found in the Koran and the Apostolic Traditions : e.g., God hath said, ” Verily, on the friends (awliyá) of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve ” (Kor. x, 63) ; and again, ” God is the friend (walí) of those who believe” (Kor. ii, 258). And the Apostle said: “Among the servants of God there are some whom the prophets and martyrs deem happy.” He was asked : ” Who are they ? Describe them to us that perchance we may love them.” He replied : ” Those who love one another, through God’s mercy, without wealth and without seeking a livelihood : their faces are luminous, and they sit on thrones of light ; they are not afraid when men are afraid, nor do they grieve when men grieve.” Then he recited : ” Verily, on the friends of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve” (Kor. x, 63). Furthermore, the Apostle said that God said : ” He who hurts a saint (walí) has allowed himself to make war on Me.”

These passages show that God has saints (awliyá) whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured with diverse kinds of miracles (karámát) and has purged of natural corruptions and has delivered from subjection to their lower soul and passion, so that all their thoughts are of Him and their intimacy is with Him alone. Such have been in past ages, and are now, and shall be hereafter until the Day of Resurrection, because God has exalted this (Moslem) community above all others and has promised to preserve the religion of Muḥammad. Inasmuch as the traditional and intellectual proofs of this religion are to be found among the divines (ʿulamá), it follows that the visible proof is to be found among the Saints and elect of God. Here we have two parties opposed to us, namely, the Muʿtazilites and the rank and file of the Anthropomorphists (Ḥashwíyya). The Muʿtazilites deny that one Moslem is specially privileged more than another ; but if a saint is not specially privileged, neither is a prophet specially privileged ; and this is infidelity. The vulgar Anthropomorphists allow that special privileges may be conferred, but assert that such privileged persons no longer exist, although they did exist in the past. It is all the same, however, whether they deny the past or the future, since one side of denial is no better than another.

God, then, has caused the prophetic evidence (burhán-i nabawí) to remain down to the present day, and has made the Saints the means whereby it is manifested, in order that the signs of the Truth and the proof of Muḥammad’s veracity may continue to be clearly seen. He has made the Saints the governors of the universe ; they have become entirely devoted to His business, and have ceased to follow their sensual affections. Through the blessing of their advent the rain falls from heaven, and through the purity of their lives the plants spring up from the earth, and through their spiritual influence the Moslems gain victories over the unbelievers. Among them there are four thousand who are concealed and do not know one another and are not aware of the excellence of their state, but in all circumstances are hidden from themselves and from mankind. Traditions have come down to this effect, and the sayings of the Saints proclaim the truth thereof, and I myself—God be praised!—have had ocular experience (khabar-i ʿiyán) of this matter. But of those who have power to loose and to bind and are the officers of the Divine court there are three hundred, called Akhyár, and forty, called Abdál, and seven, called Abrár, and four, called Awtád, and three, called Nuqabá, and one, called Quṭb or Ghawth. All these know one another and cannot act save by mutual consent.

Here the vulgar may object to my assertion that they know one another to be saints, on the ground that, if such is the case, they must be secure as to their fate in the next world. I reply that it is absurd to suppose that knowledge of saintship involves security. A believer may have knowledge of his faith and yet not be secure: why should not the same hold good of a saint who has knowledge of his saintship? Nevertheless, it is possible that God should miraculously cause the saint to know his security in regard to the future life, while maintaining him in a state of spiritual soundness and preserving him from disobedience. The Shaykhs differ on this question for the reason which I have explained. Those belonging to the four thousand who are concealed do not admit that the saint can know himself to be such, whereas those of the other class take the contrary view. Each opinion is supported by many lawyers and scholastics. Abú Isḥáq Isfaráʾiní[^p238-1] and some of the ancients hold that a saint is ignorant of his saintship, while Abú Bakr b. Fúrak[^p238-2] and others of the past generation hold that he is conscious of it. I ask the former party, what loss or evil does a saint suffer by knowing himself? If they allege that he is conceited when he knows himself to be a saint, I answer that Divine protection is a necessary condition of saintship, and one who is protected from evil cannot fall into self-conceit. It is a very common notion (sukhan-i sakht ʿámiyána) that a saint, to whom extraordinary miracles (karámát) are continually vouchsafed, does not know himself to be a saint or these miracles to be miracles. Both parties have adherents among the common people, but opinion is of no account.

The Muʿtazilites, however, deny special privileges and miracles, which constitute the essence of saintship. They affirm that all Moslems are friends (awliyá) of God when they are obedient to Him, and that anyone who fulfils the ordinances of the Faith and denies the attributes and vision of God and allows believers to be eternally damned in Hell and acknowledges only such obligations as are imposed by Reason, without regard to Revelation, is a “friend” (walí). All Moslems agree that such a person is a “friend”, but a friend of the Devil. The Muʿtazilites also maintain ʾthat, if saintship involved miracles, all believers must have miracles vouchsafed to them, because they all share in faith (ímán), and if they share in what is fundamental they must likewise share in what is derivative. They say, further, that miracles may be vouchsafed both to believers and to infidels, e.g. when anyone is hungry or fatigued on a journey some person may appear in order to give him food or mount him on an animal for riding. If it were possible, they add, for anyone to traverse a great distance in one night, the Apostle must have been that man ; yet, when he set out for Mecca, God said, “And they (the animals) carry your burdens to a land which ye would not have reached save with sore trouble to yourselves” (Kor. xvi, 7). I reply : “Your arguments are worthless, for God said, Glory to Him who transported His servant by night from the sacred mosque to the farther mosque” (Kor. xvii, 1). Miracles are special, not general ; but it would have been a general instance if all the Companions had been miraculously conveyed to Mecca, and this would have destroyed all the principles of faith in the unseen. Faith is a general term, applicable to the righteous and the wicked alike, whereas saintship is special. The journey of the Companions to Mecca falls under the former category, but inasmuch as the case of the Apostle was a special one, God conveyed him in one night from Mecca to Jerusalem, and thence to a space of two bow-lengths from the Divine presence ; and he returned ere the night was far spent. Again, to deny special privileges is manifestly unreasonable. As in a palace there are chamberlains, janitors, grooms, and viziers, who, although they are equally the king’s servants, are not equal in rank, so all believers are equal in respect of their faith, but some are obedient, some wise, some pious, and some ignorant.

SECTION.

The Shaykhs, every one, have given hints as to the true meaning of saintship. Now I will bring together as many of these selected definitions as possible.

Abú ʿAlí Júzajání says : ” The saint is annihilated in his own state and subsistent in the contemplation of the Truth : he cannot tell anything concerning himself, nor can he rest with anyone except God,” because a man has knowledge only of his own state, and when all his states are annihilated he cannot tell anything about himself; and he cannot rest with anyone else, to whom he might tell his state, because to communicate one’s hidden state to another is to reveal the secret of the Beloved, which cannot be revealed except to the Beloved himself. Moreover, in contemplation it is impossible to regard aught except God : how, then, can he be at rest with mankind ? Junayd said : ” The saint hath no fear, because fear is the expectation either of some future calamity or of the eventual loss of some object of desire, whereas the saint is the son of his time (ibn waqtihi) : he has no future that he should fear anything ; and as he hath no fear so he hath no hope, since hope is the expectation either of gaining an object of desire or of being relieved from a misfortune, and this belongs to the future ; nor does he grieve, because grief arises from the rigour of time, and how should he feel grief who is in the radiance of satisfaction (riḍá) and the garden of concord (muwáfaqat) ? ” The vulgar imagine this saying to imply that, inasmuch as the saint feels neither fear nor hope nor grief, he has security (amn) in their place ; but he has not security, for security arises from not seeing that which is hidden, and from turning one’s back on “time” ; and this (absence of security) is characteristic of those who pay no regard to their humanity (bashariyyat) and are not content with attributes. Fear and hope and security and grief all refer to the interests of the lower soul, and when that is annihilated satisfaction (riḍá) becomes an attribute of Man, and when satisfaction has been attained his states become steadfast (mustaqím) in vision of the Author of states (muḥawwil) and his back is turned on all states. Then saintship is revealed to his heart and its meaning is made clear to his inmost thoughts. Abú ʿUthmán Maghribí says : “The saint is sometimes celebrated (mashhúr), but he is not seduced (maftún),” and another says : “The saint is sometimes hidden (mastúr), but he is not celebrated.” Seduction consists in falsehood : inasmuch as the saint must be veracious, and miracles cannot possibly be performed by a liar, it follows that the saint is incapable of being seduced. These two sayings refer to the controversy whether the saint knows himself to be such : if he knows, he is celebrated, and if he does not know, he is seduced ; but the explanation of this is tedious. It is related that Ibráhím b. Adham asked a certain man whether he desired to be one of God’s saints, and on his replying “Yes,” said : “Do not covet anything in this world or the next, and devote thyself entirely to God, and turn to God with all thy heart.” To covet this world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is transitory, and to covet the next world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is everlasting : that which is transitory perishes and its renunciation becomes naught, but that which is everlasting cannot perish, hence its renunciation also is imperishable. Abú Yazíd was asked : “Who is a saint?” He answered : “That one who is patient under the command and prohibition of God,” because the more a man loves God the more does his heart revere what He commands and the farther is his body from what He forbids. It is related that Abú Yazíd said : “Once I was told that a saint of God was in such and such a town. I set out to visit him. When I arrived at his mosque he came forth from his chamber and spat on the floor of the mosque. I turned back without saluting him, and said to myself: ‘ A saint must keep the religious law in order that God may keep him in his spiritual state. Had this man been a saint his respect for the mosque would have prevented him from spitting on its floor, or God would have preserved him from marring the grace vouchsafed to him.’ The same night I dreamed that the Apostle said to me, ‘ O Abú Yazíd, the blessing of that which thou hast done is come to thee.’ Next day I attained to this degree which ye behold.” And I have heard that a man who came to visit Shaykh Abú Saʿíd entered the mosque with his left foot foremost. The Shaykh gave orders that he should be dismissed, saying : “ He who does not know how to enter the house of the Friend is not suitable for us.” Some heretics who have adopted this perilous doctrine assert that service of God (khidmat) is necessary only while one is becoming a saint, but that after one has become a saint service is abolished. This is clearly wrong. There is no “ station ” on the way to the Truth where any obligation of service is abolished. I will explain this matter fully in its proper place.

Discourse on the Affirmation of Miracles (karámát).

You must know that miracles may be vouchsafed to a saint so long as he does not infringe the obligations of the religious law. Both parties of the orthodox Moslems agree on this point, nor is it intellectually impossible, because such miracles are a species of that which is predestined by God, and their manifestation does not contradict any principle of the religious law, nor, on the other hand, is it repugnant to the mind to conceive them as a genus. A miracle is a token of a saint’s veracity, and it cannot be manifested to an impostor except as a sign that his pretensions are false. It is an extraordinary act (fiʿl náqiḍ-i ʿádat), performed while he is still subject to the obligations of religion ; and whoever is able, through knowledge given him by God, to distinguish by the method of deduction what is true from what is false, he too is a saint. Some Sunnís maintain that miracles are established, but not to the degree of an evidentiary miracle (muʿjizát[^p243-1]): they do not admit, for example, that prayers may be answered and fulfilled, and so forth, contrary to custom. I ask in reply : ” What do you consider wrong in the performance by a true saint, while he is subject to religious obligations, of an act which violates custom?” If they say that it is not a species of that which is predestined by God, this statement is erroneous ; and if they say that it is a species of that which is predestined, but that its performance by a true saint involves the annulment of prophecy and the denial of special privileges to the prophets, this assertion also is inadmissible, since the saint is specially distinguished by miracles (karámát) and the prophet by evidentiary miracles (muʿjizát) ; and inasmuch as the saint is a saint and the prophet is a prophet, there is no likeness between them to justify such precaution. The pre-eminence of the prophets depends on their exalted rank and on their being preserved from the defilement of sin, not on miracles or evidentiary miracles or acts which violate custom. All the prophets are equal so far as they all have the power of working such miracles (iʿjáz), but some are superior to others in degree. Since, then, notwithstanding this equality in regard to their actions, some prophets are superior to others, why should not miracles (karámát) which violate custom be vouchsafed also to the saints, although the prophets are superior to them ? And since, in the case of the prophets, an act which violates custom does not cause one of them to be more exalted or more specially privileged than another, so, in the case of the saints, a similar act does not cause a saint to be more specially privileged than a prophet, i.e. the saints do not become like in kind (hamsán) to the prophets. This proof will clear away, for reasonable men, any difficulties that this matter may have presented to them. “But suppose,” it may be said, “that a saint whose miracles violate custom should claim to be a prophet.” I reply that this is impossible, because saintship involves veracity, and he who tells a falsehood is no saint. Moreover, a saint who pretends to prophesy casts an imputation on (the genuineness of) evidentiary miracles, which is infidelity. Miracles (karámát) are vouchsafed only to a pious believer, and falsehood is impiety. That being so, the miracles of the saint confirm the evidence of the prophet. There is no difficulty in reconciling the two classes of miracles. The apostle establishes his prophecy by establishing the reality of evidentiary miracles, while the saint, by the miracles which he performs, establishes both the prophecy of the apostle and his own saintship. Therefore the veracious saint says the same thing as the veracious prophet. The miracles of the former are identical with the evidentiary miracles of the latter. A believer, seeing the miracles of a saint, has more faith in the veracity of the prophet, not more doubt, because there is no contradiction between the claims made by them. Similarly, in law, when a number of heirs are agreed in their claim, if one of them establishes his claim the claim of the others is established ; but not so if their claims are contradictory. Hence, when a prophet adduces evidentiary miracles as evidence that his prophecy is genuine, and when his claim is confirmed by a saint, it is impossible that any difficulty should arise.

Discourse on the difference between Evidentiary Miracles (muʿjizát) and Miracles (karámát).

Inasmuch as it has been shown that neither class of miracles can be wrought by an impostor, we must now distinguish more clearly between them. Muʿjizát involve publicity and karámát secrecy, because the result of the former is to affect others, while the latter are peculiar to the person by whom they are performed. Again, the doer of muʿjizát is quite sure that he has wrought an extraordinary miracle, whereas the doer of karámát cannot be sure whether he has really wrought a miracle or whether he is insensibly deceived (istidráj). He who performs muʿjizát has authority over the law, and in arranging it he denies or affirms, according as God commands him, that he is insensibly deceived.[^p245-1] On the other hand, he who performs karámát has no choice but to resign himself (to God’s will) and to accept the ordinances that are laid upon him, because the karámát of a saint are never in any way incompatible with the law laid down by a prophet. It may be said : ” If evidentiary miracles are the proof of a prophet’s veracity, and if nevertheless you assert that miracles of the same kind may be performed by one who is not a prophet, then they become ordinary events (muʿtád) : therefore your proof of the reality of muʿjizát annuls your argument establishing the reality of karámát.” I reply : “This is not the case. The karámat of a saint is identical with, and displays the same evidence as, the muʿjizat of a prophet : the quality of iʿjáz (inimitability) exhibited in the one instance does not impair the same quality in the other instance.” When the infidels put Khubayb on the gallows at Mecca, the Apostle, who was then seated in the mosque at Medina, saw him and told the Companions what was being done to him. God also lifted the veil from the eyes of Khubayb, so that he saw the Apostle and cried, ” Peace be with thee ! ” and God caused the Apostle to hear his salutation, and caused Khubayb to hear the Apostle’s answer. Now, the fact that the Apostle at Medina saw Khubayb at Mecca was an evidentiary miracle, and the fact that Khubayb at Mecca saw the Apostle at Medina was likewise an extraordinary act. Accordingly there is no difference between absence in time and absence in space ; for Khubayb’s miracle (karámat) was wrought when he was absent from the Apostle in space, and the miracles of later days were wrought by those who were absent from the Apostle in time. This is a clear distinction and a manifest proof that karámát cannot possibly be in contradiction with iʿjáz (miracles performed by a prophet). Karámát are not established unless they bear testimony to the truth of one who has performed a muʿjizat, and they are not vouchsafed except to a pious believer who bears such testimony. Karámát of Moslems are an extraordinary miracle (muʿjizat) of the Apostle, for as his law is permanent so must his proof (ḥujjat) also be permanent. The saints are witnesses to the truth of the Apostle’s mission, and it is impossible that a miracle (karámat) should be wrought by an unbeliever (bégána).

On this topic a story is related of Ibráhím Khawwáṣ, which is very apposite here. Ibráhím said : ” I went down into the desert in my usual state of detachment from worldly things (tajríd). After I had gone some distance a man appeared and begged me to let him be my companion. I looked at him and was conscious of a feeling of repugnance. He said to me : ’ O Ibráhím, do not be vexed. I am a Christian, and one of the Ṣábians among them. I have come from the confines of Rúm in the hope of being thy companion.’ When I knew that he was an unbeliever, I regained my equanimity, and felt it more easy to take him as my companion and to fulfil my obligations towards him. I said : ’ O monk, I fear that thou wilt suffer from want of meat and drink, for I have nothing with me.’ ’ O Ibráhím,’ said he, ’ is thy fame in the world so great, and art thou still concerned about meat and drink?’ I marvelled at his boldness and accepted him as my companion in order to test his claim. After journeying seven days and nights we were overtaken by thirst. He stopped and cried : ’ O Ibráhím, they trumpet thy praise throughout the world. Now let me see what privileges of intimacy (gustákhíhá) thou hast in this court (i.e. to what extent thou art a favourite with God), for I can endure no more.’ I laid my head on the earth and cried : ’ O Lord, do not shame me before this unbeliever, who thinks well of me ! ’ When I raised my head I saw a dish on which were placed two loaves of bread and two cups of water. We ate and drank and went on our way. After seven days had passed I resolved to test him ere he should again put me to the proof. ’ O monk,’ I said, ’ now it is thy turn. Let me see the fruits of thy mortification.’ He laid his head on the earth and muttered something. Immediately a dish appeared containing four loaves and four cups of water. I was amazed and grieved, and I despaired of my state. ‘This has appeared,’ I said, ‘for the sake of an unbeliever : how can I eat or drink thereof?’ He bade me taste, but I refused, saying, ‘Thou art not worthy of this, and it is not in harmony with thy spiritual condition. If I regard it as a miracle (karámat), miracles are not vouchsafed to unbelievers ; and if I regard it as a contribution (maʿúnat) from thee, I must suspect thee of being an impostor.’ He said : ‘Taste, O Ibráhím ! I give thee joy of two things : firstly, of my conversion to Islam (here he uttered the profession of faith), and secondly, of the great honour in which thou art held by God.’ ‘How so?’ I asked. He answered : ‘I have no miraculous powers, but my shame on account of thee made me lay my head on the earth and beg God to give me two loaves and two cups of water if the religion of Muḥammad is true, and two more loaves and cups if Ibráhím Khawwáṣ is one of God’s saints.’” Then Ibráhím ate and drank, and the man who had been a monk rose to eminence in Islam.

Now, this violation of custom, although attached to the karámat of a saint, is identical with the evidentiary miracles which are wrought by prophets, but it is rare that in a prophet’s absence an evidence should be vouchsafed to another person, or that in the presence of a saint some portion of his miraculous powers should be transferred to another person. In fact, the end of saintship is only the beginning of prophecy. That monk was one of the hidden (saints), like Pharaoh’s magicians. Ibráhím confirmed the Prophet’s power to violate custom, and his companion also was endeavouring both to confirm prophecy and to glorify saintship ; a purpose which God in His eternal providence fulfilled. This is a clear difference between karámat and iʿjáz. The manifestation of miracles to the saints is a second miracle, for they ought to be kept secret, not intentionally divulged. My Shaykh used to say that if a saint reveals his saintship and claims to be a saint, the soundness of his spiritual state is not impaired thereby; but if he takes pains to obtain publicity he is led astray by self-conceit.

Discourse on the performance of miracles belonging to the evidentiary class by those who pretend to godship.

The Shaykhs of this sect and all orthodox Moslems are agreed that an extraordinary act resembling a prophetic miracle (muʿjizat) may be performed by an unbeliever, in order that by means of his performance he may be shown beyond doubt to be an impostor. Thus, for example, Pharaoh lived four hundred years without once falling ill ; and when he climbed up to any high ground the water followed him, and stopped when he stopped, and moved when he moved. Nevertheless, intelligent men did not hesitate to deny his pretensions to godship, inasmuch as every intelligent person acknowledges that God is not incarnate (mujassam) and composite (murakkab). You will judge by analogy the wondrous acts related of Shaddád, who was the lord of Iram, and Nimrod. Similarly, we are told on trustworthy authority that in the last days Dajjál will come and will claim godship, and that two mountains will go with him, one on his right hand and the other on his left ; and that the mountain on his right hand will be the place of felicity, and the mountain on his left hand will be the place of torment ; and that he will call the people to himself and will punish those who refuse to join him. But though he should perform a hundredfold amount of such extraordinary acts, no intelligent person would doubt the falsity of his claim, for it is well known that God does not sit on an ass and is not blind. Such things fall under the principle of Divine deception (istidráj). So, again, one who falsely pretends to be an apostle may perform an extraordinary act, which proves him an impostor, just as a similar act performed by a true apostle proves him genuine. But no such act can be performed if there be any possibility of doubt or any difficulty in distinguishing the true claimant from the impostor, for in that case the principle of allegiance (bayʿat) would be nullified. It is possible, moreover, that something of the same kind as a miracle (karámat) may be performed by a pretender to saintship who, although his conduct is bad, is blameless in his religion, inasmuch as by that miraculous act he confirms the truth of the Apostle and manifests the grace of God vouchsafed to him and does not attribute the act in question to his own power. One who speaks the truth, without evidence, in the fundamental matter of faith (ímán), will always speak the truth, with evidence and firm belief, in the matter of saintship, because his belief is of the same quality as the belief of the saint ; and though his actions do not square with his belief, his claim of saintship is not demonstrably contradicted by his evil conduct, any more than his claim of faith could be. In fact, miracles (karámát) and saintship are Divine gifts, not things acquired by Man, so that human actions (kasb) cannot become the cause of Divine guidance.

I have already said that the saints are not preserved from sin (maʿṣúm), for sinlessness belongs to the prophets, but they are protected (maḥfúẓ) from any evil that involves the denial of their saintship ; and the denial of saintship, after it has come into being, depends on something inconsistent with faith, namely, apostasy (riddat) : it does not depend on sin. This is the doctrine of Muḥammad b. ʿAlí Ḥakím of Tirmidh, and also of Junayd, Abú ʾl-Ḥasan Núrí, Ḥárith Muḥásibí, and many other mystics (ahl-i ḥaqáʾiq). But those who attach importance to conduct (ahl-i muʿámalát), like Sahl b. ʿAbdalláh of Tustar, Abú Sulaymán Dárání, Ḥamdún Qaṣṣár, and others, maintain that saintship involves unceasing obedience (ṭáʿat), and that when a great sin (kabíra) occurs to the mind of a saint he is deposed from his saintship. Now, as I have stated before, there is a consensus of opinion (ijmáʿ) among Moslems that a great sin does not put anyone outside the pale of faith ; and one saintship (wiláyat) is no better than another. Therefore, since the saintship of knowledge of God (maʿrifat), which is the foundation of all miracles vouchsafed by Divine grace (karámathá), is not lost through sin, it is impossible that what is inferior to that in excellence and grace (karámat) should disappear because of sin. The controversy among the Shaykhs on this matter has run to great length, and I do not intend to record it here.

It is most important, however, that you should know with certainty in what state this miraculous grace is manifested to the saint : in sobriety or intoxication, in rapture (ghalabat) or composure (tamkín). I have fully explained the meaning of intoxication and sobriety in my account of the doctrine of Abú Yazíd. He and Dhu ‘l-Nún the Egyptian and Muḥammad b. Khafíf and Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) and Yaḥyá b. Muʿádh Rází and others hold that miracles are not vouchsafed to a saint except when he is in the state of intoxication, whereas the miracles of the prophets are wrought in the state of sobriety. Hence, according to their doctrine, this is a clear distinction between muʿjizát and karámát, for the saint, being enraptured, pays no heed to the people and does not call upon them to follow him, while the prophet, being sober, exerts himself to attain his object and challenges the people to rival what he has done. Moreover, the prophet may choose whether he will manifest or conceal his extraordinary powers, but the saints have no such choice ; sometimes a miracle is not granted to them when they desire it, and sometimes it is bestowed when they do not desire it, for the saint has no propaganda, so that his attributes should be subsistent, but he is hidden and his proper state is to have his attributes annihilated. The prophet is a man of law (ṣáḥib sharʿ), and the saint is a man of inward feeling (ṣáḥib sirr). Accordingly, a miracle (karámat) will not be manifested to a saint unless he is in a state of absence from himself and bewilderment, and unless his faculties are entirely under the control of God. While saints are with themselves and maintain the state of humanity (bashariyyat), they are veiled ; but when the veil is lifted they are bewildered and amazed through realizing the bounties of God. A miracle cannot be manifested except in the state of unveiledness (kashf), which is the rank of proximity (qurb) ; and whoever is in that state, to him worthless stones appear even as gold. This is the state of intoxication with which no human being, the prophets alone excepted, is permanently endowed. Thus, one day, Ḥáritha was transported from this world and had the next world revealed to him ; he said : “I have cut myself loose from this world, so that its stones and its gold and its silver and its clay are all one to me.” Next day he was seen tending asses, and on being asked what he was doing, he said : “I am trying to get the food that I need.” Therefore, the saints, while they are sober, are as ordinary men, but while they are intoxicated their rank is the same as that of the prophets, and the whole universe becomes like gold unto them. Shiblí says—

“Gold wherever we go, and pearls Wherever we turn, and silver in the waste.”

I have heard the Master and Imám Abú ‘l-Qásim Qushayrí say : “Once I asked Ṭabarání about the beginning of his spiritual experience. He told me that on one occasion he wanted a stone from the river-bed at Sarakhs. Every stone that he touched turned into a gem, and he threw them all away.” This was because stones and gems were the same to him, or rather, gems were of less value, since he had no desire for them. And I have heard Khwája Imám Khazáʾiní at Sarakhs relate as follows : “In my boyhood I went to a certain place to get mulberry leaves for silkworms. When it was midday I climbed a tree and began to shake the branches. While I was thus employed Shaykh Abú ‘l-Faḍl b. al-Ḥasan passed by, but he did not see me, and I had no doubt that he was beside himself and that his heart was with God. Suddenly he raised his head and cried with the boldness of intimacy : ‘O Lord, it is more than a year since Thou hast given me a small piece of silver (dángí) that I might have my hair cut. Is this the way to treat Thy friends ?’ No sooner had he spoken than I saw all the leaves and boughs and roots of the trees turned to gold. Abú ‘l-Faḍl exclaimed : ‘How strange ! The least hint that I utter is a backsliding (hama taʿríd-i má íʿrád ast). One cannot say a word to Thee for the sake of relieving one’s mind.’” It is related that Shiblí cast four hundred dínárs into the Tigris. When asked what he was doing, he replied : “Stones are better in the water.” “But why,” they said, “don’t you give the money to the poor ? ” He answered : “Glory to God ! what plea can I urge before Him if I remove the veil from my own heart only to place it on the hearts of my brother Moslems ? It is not religious to wish them worse than myself.” All these cases belong to the state of intoxication, which I have already explained.

On the other hand, Junayd and Abú ‘l-ʿAbbás Sayyárí and Abú Bakr Wásiṭí and Muḥammad b. ʿAlí of Tirmidh, the author of the doctrine, hold that miracles are manifested in the state of sobriety and composure (ṣahw ú tamkín), not in the state of intoxication. They argue that the saints of God are the governors of His kingdom and the overseers of the universe, which God has committed absolutely to their charge : therefore their judgments must be the soundest of all, and their hearts must be the most tenderly disposed of all towards the creatures of God. They are mature (rasídagán) ; and whereas agitation and intoxication are marks of inexperience, with maturity agitation is transmuted into composure. Then, and only then, is one a saint in reality, and only then are miracles genuine. It is well known among Ṣúfís that every night the Awtád must go round the whole universe, and if there should be any place on which their eyes have not fallen, next day some imperfection will appear in that place ; and they must then inform the Quṭb, in order that he may fix his attention on the weak spot, and that by his blessing the imperfection may be removed. As regards the assertion that gold and earth are one to the saint, this indifference is a sign of intoxication and failure to see truly. More excellent is the man of true sight and sound perception, to whom gold is gold and earth is earth, but who recognizes the evil of the former and says : “O yellow ore ! O white ore ! beguile some one else, for I am aware of your corruptedness.” He who sees the corruptedness of gold and silver perceives them to be a veil (between himself and God), and God will reward him for having renounced them. Contrariwise, he to whom gold is even as earth is not made perfect by renouncing earth. Ḥáritha, being intoxicated, declared that stones and gold were alike to him, but Abú Bakr, being sober, perceived the evil of laying hands on worldly wealth, and knew that God would reward him for rejecting it. Therefore he renounced it, and when the Apostle asked him what he had left for his family he answered, “God and His Apostle.” And the following story is related by Abú Bakr Warráq of Tirmidh: “One day Muḥammad b. ʿAlí (al-Ḥakím) said that he would take me somewhere. I replied : ‘It is for the Shaykh to command.’ Soon after we set out I saw an exceedingly dreadful wilderness, and in the midst thereof a golden throne placed under a green tree beside a fountain of running water. Seated on the throne was a person clad in beautiful raiment, who rose when Muḥammad b. ʿAlí approached, and bade him sit on the throne. After a while, people came from every side until forty were gathered together. Then Muḥammad b. ʿAlí waved his hand, and immediately food appeared from heaven, and we ate. Afterwards Muḥammad b. ʿAlí asked a question of a man who was present, and he in reply made a long discourse of which I did not understand a single word. At last the Shaykh begged leave and took his departure, saying to me: ‘Go, for thou art blest.’ On our return to Tirmidh, I asked him what was that place and who was that man. He told me that the place was the Desert of the Israelites (tíh-i Baní Isráʾíl) and that the man was the Quṭb on whom the order of the universe depends. ‘O Shaykh,’ I said, ‘how did we reach the Desert of the Israelites from Tirmidh in such a brief time ?’ He answered : ‘O Abú Bakr, it is thy business to arrive (rasídan), not to ask questions (pursídan)!’” This is a mark, not of intoxication, but of sanity.

Now I will mention some miracles and stories of the Ṣúfís, and link thereto certain evidence which is to be found in the Book (the Koran).

Discourse concerning their Miracles.

The reality of miracles having been established by logical argument, you must now become acquainted with the evidence of the Koran and the genuine Traditions of the Apostle. Both Koran and Tradition proclaim the reality of miracles and extraordinary acts wrought by saints. To deny this is to deny the authority of the sacred texts. One example is the text, “And We caused the clouds to overshadow you and the manna and the quails to descend upon you” (Kor. ii, 54). If any sceptic should assert that this was an evidentiary miracle (muʿjizat) of Moses, I raise no objection, because all the miracles of the saints are an evidentiary miracle of Muḥammad ; and if he says that this miracle was wrought in the absence of Moses, although it occurred in his time, and that therefore it was not necessarily wrought by him, I reply that the same principle holds good in the case of Moses, when he quitted his people and went to Mount Sinai, as in the case of Muḥammad ; for there is no difference between being absent in time and being absent in space. We are also told of the miracle of Áṣaf b. Barkhiyá, who brought the throne of Bilqís to Solomon in the twinkling of an eye (Kor. xxvii, 40). This cannot have been a muʿjizat, for Áṣaf was not an apostle ; had it been a muʿjizat, it must have been wrought by Solomon : therefore it was a karámat. We are told also of Mary that whenever Zacharias went into her chamber he found winter fruits in summer and summer fruits in winter, so that he said : “‘Whence hadst thou this ?’ She answered, ‘It is from God’” (Kor. iii, 32). Everyone admits that Mary was not an apostle. Furthermore, we have the story of the men of the cave (aṣḥáb al-kahf), how their dog spoke to them, and how they slept and turned about in the cave (Kor. xviii, 17). All these were extraordinary acts, and since they certainly were not a muʿjizat, they must have been a karámat. Such miracles (karámát) may be, for example, the answering of prayers through the accomplishment of wishes conceived by one who is subject to the religious law (ba-ḥuṣúl-i umúr-i mawhúm andar zamán-i taklíf), or the traversing of great distances in a short time, or the appearance of food from an unaccustomed place, or power to read the thoughts of others, etc.

Among the genuine Traditions is the story of the cave (ḥadíth al-ghár), which is told as follows. One day the Companions of the Apostle begged him to relate to them some marvellous tale of the ancient peoples. He said : ” Once three persons were going to a certain place. At eventide they took shelter in a cave, and while they were asleep a rock fell from the mountain and blocked the mouth of the cave. They said to one another, ʿWe shall never escape from here unless we make our disinterested actions plead for us before God.ʾ So one of them began : ʿI had a father and mother and I had no worldly goods except a goat, whose milk I used to give to them ; and every day I used to gather a bundle of firewood and sell it and spend the money in providing food for them and myself. One night I came home rather late, and before I milked the goat and steeped their food in the milk they had fallen asleep. I kept the bowl in my hand and stood there, without having eaten anything, until morning, when they awoke and ate ; then I sat down. ʿO Lordʾ (he continued), ʿif I speak the truth concerning this matter, send us deliverance and come to our aid !ʾ ” The Apostle said : ” Thereupon the rock moved a little and a crevice appeared. The next man said : ʿ There was a beautiful blind girl, with whom I was deeply in love, but she would not listen to my suit. I managed to send to her a hundred and twenty dínárs with a promise that she should keep the money if she would be mine for one night. When she came the fear of God seized my heart. I turned from her and let her keep the money. He added, ʿO God, if I speak the truth, deliver us !ʾ ” The Apostle said : ” Then the rock moved a little further and the crevice widened, but they could not yet go forth. The third man said : ʿI had some labourers working for me. When the work was done they all received their wages except one, who disappeared. With his wages I bought a sheep. Next year there were two, and in the year after that there were four, and they soon became a large flock. After several years the labourer returned and asked me for his wages. I said to him, ” Go and take all these sheep ; they are your property.” He thought I must be mocking him, but I assured him that it was true, and he went off with the whole flock. The narrator added, ’ O Lord, if I speak the truth, deliver us ! ’ ” ” He had scarcely finished,” said the Apostle, ” when the rock moved away from the mouth of the cave and let the three men come forth.” [^p256-1] It is related that Abú Saʿíd Kharráz said : ” For a long time I used to eat only once in three days. I was journeying in the desert, and on the third day I felt weak through hunger. A voice from heaven cried to me, ’ Dost thou prefer food that will quiet thy lower nature, or an expedient that will enable thee to overcome thy weakness without food ? ’ I replied, ’ O God, give me strength ! ’ Then I rose and travelled twelve stages without meat or drink.” It is well known that at the present day the house of Sahl b. ʿAbdállah at Tustar is called the House of the Wild Beasts (bayt al-sibáʿ), and the people of Tustar are agreed that many wild beasts used to come to him, and that he fed and tended them. Abú ‘l-Qásim of Merv tells the following story : ” As I was walking on the seashore with Abú Saʿíd Kharráz, I saw a youth clad in a patched frock and carrying a bucket (rakwa), to which an ink-bottle was fastened. Kharráz said : ’ When I look at this youth he seems to be one of the adepts (rasídagán), but when I look at his ink-bottle I think he is a student. Let me question him.’ So he accosted the youth and said, ’ What is the way to God ? ’ The youth answered : ’ There are two ways to God : the way of the vulgar and the way of the elect. Thou hast no knowledge of the latter, but the way of the vulgar, which thou pursuest, is to regard thine own actions as the cause of attaining to God, and to suppose that an ink-bottle is one of the things that interfere with attainment.’ ” Dhu ‘l-Nún the Egyptian says : ” Once I embarked in a ship voyaging from Egypt to Jidda. Among the passengers was a youth wearing a patched frock. I was eager to be his companion, but he inspired me with such awe that I did not venture to address him, for his spiritual state was very exalted and he was constantly engaged in devotion. One day a certain man lost a purse of jewels, and suspicion fell on this youth. They were about to maltreat him, but I said, ’ Let me question him courteously.’ I told him that he was suspected of theft and that I had saved him from maltreatment. ’ And now,’ I said, ’ what is to be done ? ’ He looked towards Heaven and spoke a few words. The fishes came to the surface of the sea, each with a jewel in its mouth. He took a jewel and gave it to his accuser ; then he set his foot on the water and walked away. Thereupon the real thief dropped the purse, and the people in the ship repented.” Ibráhím Raqqí[^p257-1] is related to have said : ” In my novitiate I set out to visit Muslim Maghribí. I found him in his mosque, acting as precentor. He pronounced al-ḥamd incorrectly. I said to myself, ‘My trouble has been wasted.’ Next day, when I was going to the bank of the Euphrates to perform the religious ablution, I saw a lion asleep on the road. I turned back, and was faced by another lion which had been following me. Hearing my cry of despair, Muslim came forth from his cell. When the lions saw him they humbled themselves before him. He took the ear of each one and rubbed it, saying, ’ O dogs of God, have not I told you that you must not interfere with my guests ? ’ Then he said to me: ’ O Abú Isḥáq, thou hast busied thyself with correcting thy exterior for the sake of God’s creatures, hence thou art afraid of them ; but it has been my business to correct my interior for God’s sake, hence His creatures are afraid of me.’ ” One day my Shaykh set out from Bayt al-Jinn to Damascus. Heavy rain had begun to fall, and I was walking with difficulty in the mire. I noticed that the Shaykh’s shoes and clothes were perfectly dry. On my pointing this out to him, he said : ” Yes ; God has preserved me from mud ever since I put unquestioning trust in Him and guarded my interior from the desolation of cupidity.” Once an experience occurred to me which I could not unravel. I set out to visit Shaykh Abú ‘l-Qásim Gurgání at Ṭús. I found him alone in his chamber in the mosque, and he was expounding precisely the same difficulty to a pillar, so that I was answered without having asked the question. “O Shaykh,” I cried, ” to whom art thou saying this ? ” He replied : ” O son, God just now caused this pillar to speak and ask me this question.” In Farghána, at a village called Ashlátak,[^p258-1] there was an old man, one of the Awtád of the earth. His name was Báb ʿUmar[^p258-2] — all the dervishes in that country give the title of Báb to their great Shaykhs — and he had an old wife called Fáṭima. I went from Uzkand to see him. When I entered his presence he said : “Why have you come?” I replied: ” In order that I might see the Shaykh in person and that he might look on me with kindness.” He said : ” I have been seeing you continually since such and such a day, and I wish to see you as long as you are not removed from my sight.” I computed the day and year : it was the very day on which my conversion began. The Shaykh said : ” To traverse distance (sipardan-i masáfat) is child’s play : henceforth pay visits by means of thought (himmat) ; it is not worth while to visit any person (shakhs), and there is no virtue in bodily presence (ḥuḍúr-i ashbáh).” Then he bade Fáṭima bring something to eat. She brought a dish of new grapes, although it was not the season for them, and some fresh ripe dates, which cannot possibly be procured in Farghána. On another occasion, while I was sitting alone, as is my custom, beside the tomb of Shaykh Abú Saʿíd at Mihna, I saw a white pigeon fly under the cloth (fúta) covering the sepulchre. I supposed that the bird had escaped from its owner, but when I looked under the cloth nothing was to be seen. This happened again next day, and also on the third day. I was at a loss to understand it, until one night I dreamed of the saint and asked him about my experience. He answered : “That pigeon is my good conduct (safá-yi muʿámalat), which comes every day to my tomb to feast with me (ba-munádamat-i man).”[^p259-1] I might adduce many more of these tales without exhausting them, but my purpose in this book is to establish the principles of Ṣúfiism. As regards derivatives and matters of conduct books have been compiled by the traditionists (naqqáldn), and these topics are disseminated from the pulpit by preachers (mudhakkirán). Now I will give, in one or two sections, an adequate account of certain points bearing on the present discussion, in order that I may not have to return to it again.

Discourse on the Superiority of the Prophets to the Saints.

You must know that, by universal consent of the Ṣúfí Shaykhs, the saints are at all times and in all circumstances subordinate to the prophets, whose missions they confirm.

The prophets are superior to the saints, because the end of saintship is only the beginning of prophecy. Every prophet is a saint, but some saints are not prophets. The prophets are constantly exempt from the attributes of humanity, while the saints are so only temporarily ; the fleeting state (ḥál) of the saint is the permanent station (maqám) of the prophet ; and that which to the saints is a station (maqám) is to the prophets a veil (ḥijáb). This view is held unanimously by the Sunní divines and the Ṣúfí mystics, but it is opposed by a sect of the Ḥashwiyya—the Anthropomorphists (mujassima) of Khurásán—who discourse in a self-contradictory manner concerning the principles of Unification (tawḥíd), and who, although they do not know the fundamental doctrine of Ṣúfiism, call themselves saints. Saints they are indeed, but saints of the Devil. They maintain that the saints are superior to the prophets, and it is a sufficient proof of their error that they declare an ignoramus to be more excellent than Muḥammad, the Chosen of God. The same vicious opinion is held by another sect of Anthropomorphists (mushabbiha), who pretend to be Ṣúfís, and admit the doctrines of the incarnation of God and His descent (into the human body) by transmigration (intiqál), and the division (tajziya) of His essence. I will treat fully of these matters when I give my promised account of the two reprobated sects (of Ṣúfís). The sects to which I am now referring claim to be Moslems, but they agree with the Brahmans in denying special privileges to the prophets ; and whoever believes in this doctrine becomes an infidel. Moreover, the prophets are propagandists and Imáms, and the saints are their followers, and it is absurd to suppose that the follower of an Imám is superior to the Imám himself. In short, the lives, experiences, and spiritual powers of all the saints together appear as nothing compared with one act of a true prophet, because the saints are seekers and pilgrims, whereas the prophets have arrived and have found and have returned with the command to preach and to convert the people. If any one of the above-mentioned heretics should urge that an ambassador sent by a king is usually inferior to the person to whom he is sent, as e.g. Gabriel is inferior to the Apostles, and that this is against my argument, I reply that an ambassador sent to a single person should be inferior to him, but when an ambassador is sent to a large number of persons or to a people, he is superior to them, as the Apostles are superior to the nations. Therefore one moment of the prophets is better than the whole life of the saints, because when the saints reach their goal they tell of contemplation (musháhadat) and obtain release from the veil of humanity (bashariyyat), although they are essentially men. On the other hand, contemplation is the first step of the apostle ; and since the apostle’s starting-place is the saint’s goal, they cannot be judged by the same standard. Do not you perceive that, according to the unanimous opinion of all the saints who seek God, the station of union (jamʿ) belongs to the perfection of saintship ? Now, in this station, a man attains such a degree of rapturous love that his intelligence is enraptured in gazing upon the act of God (fiʿl), and in his longing for the Divine Agent (fáʿil) he regards the whole universe as that and sees nothing but that. Thus Abú ʿAlí Rúdbárí says : “Were the vision of that which we serve to vanish from us, we should lose the name of servantship (ʿubúdiyyat),” for we derive the glory of worship (ʿibádat) solely from vision of Him. This is the beginning of the state of the prophets, inasmuch as separation (tafriqa) is inconceivable in relation to them. They are entirely in the essence of union, whether they affirm or deny, whether they approach or turn away, whether they are at the beginning or at the end. Abraham, in the beginning of his state, looked on the sun and said : “This is my Lord,” and he looked on the moon and stars and said : “This is my Lord” (Kor. vi, 76-8), because his heart was overwhelmed by the Truth and he was united in the essence of union. Therefore he saw naught else, or if he saw aught else he did not see it with the eye of “otherness” (ghayr), but with the eye of union (jamʿ), and in the reality of that vision he disavowed his own and said: “I love not those that set” (Kor. vi, 76). As he began with union, so he ended with union. Saintship has a beginning and an end, but prophecy has not. The prophets were prophets from the first, and shall be to the last, and before they existed they were prophets in the knowledge and will of God. Abú Yazíd was asked about the state of the prophets. He replied : ” Far be it from me to say ! We have no power to judge of them, and in our notions of them we are wholly ourselves. God has placed their denial and affirmation in such an exalted degree that human vision cannot reach unto it.” Accordingly, as the rank of the saints is hidden from the perception of mankind, so the rank of the prophets is hidden from the judgment of the saints. Abú Yazíd was the proof (ḥujjat) of his age, and he says : ” I saw that my spirit (sirr) was borne to the heavens. It looked at nothing and gave no heed, though Paradise and Hell were displayed to it, for it was freed from phenomena and veils. Then I became a bird, whose body was of Oneness and whose wings were of Everlastingness, and I continued to fly in the air of the Absolute (huwiyyat), until I passed into the sphere of Purification (tanzíh), and gazed upon the field of Eternity (azaliyyat) and beheld there the tree of Oneness. When I looked I myself was all those. I cried : ’ O Lord, with my egoism (maní-yi man) I cannot attain to Thee, and I cannot escape from my selfhood. What am I to do?’ God spake: ’ O Abú Yazíd, thou must win release from thy ” thou-ness” by following My beloved i.e. (Muḥammad). Smear thine eyes with the dust of his feet and follow him continually.’ ” This is a long narrative. The Ṣúfís call it the Ascension (miʿráj) of Báyazíd ;[^p262-1] and the term ” ascension ” denotes proximity to God (qurb). The ascension of prophets takes place outwardly and in the body, whereas that of saints takes place inwardly and in the spirit. The body of an apostle resembles tᵇ⁻ heart and spirit of a saint in purity and nearness to God. This is a manifest superiority. When a saint is enraptured and intoxicated he is withdrawn from himself by means of a spiritual ladder and brought near to God ; and as soon as he returns to the state of sobriety all those evidences have taken shape in his mind and he has gained knowledge of them. Accordingly, there is a great difference between one who is carried thither in person and one who is carried thither only in thought (fikrat), for thought involves duality.

Discourse on the Superiority of the Prophets and Saints to the Angels.

The whole community of orthodox Moslems and all the Ṣúfí Shaykhs agree that the prophets and such of the saints as are guarded from sin (maḥfúẓ) are superior to the angels. The opposite view is held by the Muʿtazilites, who declare that the angels are superior to the prophets, being of more exalted rank, of more subtle constitution, and more obedient to God. I reply that this is not as you imagine, for an obedient body, an exalted rank, and a subtle constitution cannot be causes of superiority, which belongs only to those on whom God has bestowed it. Iblís had all the qualities that you mention, yet he is universally acknowledged to have become accursed. The superiority of the prophets is indicated by the fact that God commanded the angels to worship Adam ; for the state of one who is worshipped is higher than the state of the worshipper. If they argue that, just as a true believer is superior to the Kaʿba, an inanimate mass of stone, although he bows down before it, so the angels may be superior to Adam, although they bowed down before him, I reply : ” No one says that a believer bows down to a “house or an altar or a wall, but all say that he bows down to God, and it is admitted by all that the angels bowed down to Adam (Kor. ii, 32). How, then, can the Kaʿba be compared to Adam ? A traveller may worship God on the back of the animal which he is riding, and he is excused if his face be not turned towards the Kaʿba ; and, in like manner, one who has lost his bearings in a desert, so that he cannot tell the direction of the Kaʿba, will have done his duty in whatever direction he may turn to pray. The angels offered no excuse when they bowed down to Adam, and the one who made an excuse for himself became accursed.” These are clear proofs to any person of insight.

Again, the angels are equal to the prophets in knowledge of God, but not in rank. The angels are without lust, covetousness, and evil ; their nature is devoid of hypocrisy and guile, and they are instinctively obedient to God ; whereas lust is an impediment in human nature ; and men have a propensity to commit sins and to be impressed by the vanities of this world ; and Satan has so much power over their bodies that he circulates with the blood in their veins ; and closely attached to them is the lower soul (nafs), which incites them to all manner of wickedness. Therefore, one whose nature has all these characteristics and who, in spite of the violence of his lust, refrains from immorality, and notwithstanding his covetousness renounces this world, and, though his heart is still tempted by the Devil, turns back from sin and averts his face from sensual depravity in order to occupy himself with devotion and persevere in piety and mortify his lower soul and contend against the Devil, such a one is in reality superior to the angel who is not the battle-field of lust, and is naturally without desire of food and pleasures, and has no care for wife and child and kinsfolk, and need not have recourse to means and instruments, and is not absorbed in corrupt ambitions. A Gabriel, who worships God so many thousands of years in the hope of gaining a robe of honour, and the honour bestowed on him was that of acting as Muḥammad’s groom on the night of the Ascension—how should he be superior to one who disciplines and mortifies his lower soul by day and night in this world, until God looks on him with favour and grants to him the grace of seeing Himself and delivers him from all distracting thoughts ? When the pride of the angels passed all bounds, and every one of them vaunted the purity of his conduct and spoke with an unbridled tongue in blame of mankind, God resolved that He would show to them their real state. He therefore bade them choose three of the chief among them, in whom they had confidence, to go to the earth and be its governors and reform its people. So three angels were chosen, but before they came to the earth one of them perceived its corruption and begged God to let him return. When the other two arrived on the earth God changed their nature so that they felt a desire for food and drink and were inclined to lust, and God punished them on that account, and the angels were forced to recognize the superiority of mankind to themselves.[^p265-1] In short, the elect among the true believers are superior to the elect among the angels, and the ordinary believers are superior to the ordinary angels. Accordingly those men who are preserved (maʿṣúm) and protected (maḥfúẓ) from sin are more excellent than Gabriel and Michael, and those who are not thus preserved are better than the Recording Angels (ḥafaẓa) and the noble Scribes (kirám-i kátibín). Something has been said on this subject by every one of the Shaykhs. God awards superiority to whom He pleases, over whom He pleases. You must know that saintship is a Divine mystery which is revealed only through conduct (rawish). A saint is known only to a saint. If this matter could be made plain to all reasonable men it would be impossible to distinguish the friend from the foe or the spiritual adept from the careless worldling. Therefore God so willed that the pearl of His love should be set in the shell of popular contempt and be cast into the sea of affliction, in order that those who seek it may hazard their lives on account of its preciousness and dive to the bottom of this ocean of death, where they will either win their desire or bring their mortal state to an end.

8. THE KHARRÁZÍS.

They are the followers of Abú Saʿíd Kharráz, who wrote brilliant works on Ṣúfiism and attained a high degree in detachment from the world. He was the first to explain the state of annihilation and subsistence (fáná ú baqá), and he comprehended his whole doctrine in these two terms. Now I will declare their meaning and show the errors into which some have fallen in this respect, in order that you may know what his doctrine is and what the Ṣúfís intend when they employ these current expressions.

Discourse on Subsistence (baqá) and Annihilation (faná).

You must know that annihilation and subsistence have one meaning in science and another meaning in mysticism, and that formalists (ẓáhiriyán) are more puzzled by these words than by any other technical terms of the Ṣúfís. Subsistence in its scientific and etymological acceptation is of three kinds : (1) a subsistence that begins and ends in annihilation, e.g. this world, which had a beginning and will have an end, and is now subsistent ; (2) a subsistence that came into being and will never be annihilated, viz. Paradise and Hell and the next world and its inhabitants ; (3) a subsistence that always was and always will be, viz. the subsistence of God and His eternal attributes. Accordingly, knowledge of annihilation lies in your knowing that this world is perishable, and knowledge of subsistence lies in your knowledge that the next world is everlasting.

But the subsistence and annihilation of a state (ḥál) denotes, for example, that when ignorance is annihilated knowledge is necessarily subsistent, and that when sin is annihilated piety is subsistent, and that when a man acquires knowledge of his piety his forgetfulness (ghaflat) is annihilated by remembrance of God (dhikr), i.e., when anyone gains knowledge of God and becomes subsistent in knowledge of Him he is annihilated from (entirely loses) ignorance of Him, and when he is annihilated from forgetfulness he becomes subsistent in remembrance of Him, and this involves the discarding of blameworthy attributes and the substitution of praiseworthy attributes. A different signification, however, is attached to the terms in question by the elect among the Ṣúfís. They do not refer these expressions to “knowledge” (ʿilm) or to “state” (ḥál), but apply them solely to the degree of perfection attained by the saints who have become free from the pains of mortification and have escaped from the prison of “stations” and the vicissitude of “states”, and whose search has ended in discovery, so that they have seen all things visible, and have heard all things audible, and have discovered all the secrets of the heart ; and who, recognizing the imperfection of their own discovery, have turned away from all things and have purposely become annihilated in the object of desire, and in the very essence of desire have lost all desires of their own, for when a man becomes annihilated from his attributes he attains to perfect subsistence, he is neither near nor far, neither stranger nor intimate, neither sober nor intoxicated, neither separated nor united ; he has no name, or sign, or brand, or mark.

In short, real annihilation from anything involves consciousness of its imperfection and absence of desire for it, not merely that a man should say, when he likes a thing, “I am subsistent therein,” or when he dislikes it, that he should say, “I am annihilated therefrom” ; for these qualities are characteristic of one who is still seeking. In annihilation there is no love or hate, and in subsistence there is no consciousness of union or separation. Some wrongly imagine that annihilation signifies loss of essence and destruction of personality, and that subsistence indicates the subsistence of God in Man ; both these notions are absurd. In India I had a dispute on this subject with a man who claimed to be versed in Koranic exegesis and theology. When I examined his pretensions I found that he knew nothing of annihilation and subsistence, and that he could not distinguish the eternal from the phenomenal. Many ignorant Ṣúfís consider that total annihilation (faná-yi kulliyyat) is possible, but this is a manifest error, for annihilation of the different parts of a material substance (ṭínatí) can never take place. I ask these ignorant and mistaken men : “What do you mean by this kind of annihilation ?” If they answer, ” Annihilation of substance ” (faná-yi ʿayn), that is impossible ; and if they answer, ” Annihilation of attributes,” that is only possible in so far as one attribute may be annihilated through the subsistence of another attribute, both attributes belonging to Man ; but it is absurd to suppose that anyone can subsist through the attributes of another individual. The Nestorians of Rúm and the Christians hold that Mary annihilated by self-mortification all the attributes of humanity (awṣáf-i násútí) and that the Divine subsistence became attached to her, so that she was made subsistent through the subsistence of God, and that Jesus was the result thereof, and that he was not originally composed of the stuff of humanity, because his subsistence is produced by realization of the subsistence of God ; and that, in consequence of this, he and his mother and God are all subsistent through one subsistence, which is eternal and an attribute of God. All this agrees with the doctrine of the anthropomorphistic sects of the Ḥashwiyya, who maintain that the Divine essence is a locus of phenomena (maḥall-i ḥawádith) and that the Eternal may have phenomenal attributes. I ask all who proclaim such tenets : “What difference is there between the view that the Eternal is the locus of the phenomenal and the view that the phenomenal is the locus of the Eternal, or between the assertion that the Eternal has phenomenal attributes and the assertion that the phenomenal has eternal attributes ? ” Such doctrines involve materialism (dahr) and destroy the proof of the phenomenal nature of the universe, and compel us to say that both the Creator and His creation are eternal or that both are phenomenal, or that what is created may be commingled with what is uncreated, and that what is uncreated may descend into what is created. If, as they cannot help admitting, the creation is phenomenal, then their Creator also must be phenomenal, because the locus of a thing is like its substance ; if the locus (maḥall) is phenomenal, it follows that the contents of the locus (ḥall) are phenomenal too. In fine, when one thing is linked and united and commingled with another, both things are in principle as one.

Accordingly, our subsistence and annihilation are attributes of ourselves, and resemble each other in respect of their being our attributes. Annihilation is the annihilation of one attribute through the subsistence of another attribute. One may speak, however, of an annihilation that is independent of subsistence, and also of a subsistence that is independent of annihilation : in that case annihilation means “annihilation of all remembrance of other ”, and subsistence means ” subsistence of the remembrance of God ” (baqá-yi dhikr-i ḥaqq). Whoever is annihilated from his own will subsists in the will of God, because thy will is perishable and the will of God is everlasting : when thou standest by thine own will thou standest by annihilation, but when thou art absolutely controlled by the will of God thou standest by subsistence. Similarly, the power of fire transmutes to its own quality anything that falls into it, and surely the power of God’s will is greater than that of fire ; but fire affects only the quality of iron without changing its substance, for iron can never become fire.

SECTION.

All the Shaykhs have given subtle indications on this subject. Abú Saʿíd Kharráz, the author of the doctrine, says : ” Annihilation is annihilation of consciousness of manhood (ʿubúdiyyat), and subsistence is subsistence in the contemplation of Godhead (iláhiyyat),” i.e., it is an imperfection to be conscious in one’s actions that one is a man, and one attains to real manhood (bandagí) when one is not conscious of them, but is annihilated so as not to see them, and becomes subsistent through beholding the action of God. Hence all one’s actions are referred to God, not to one’s self, and whereas a man’s actions that are connected with himself are imperfect, those which are attached to him by God are perfect. Therefore, when anyone becomes annihilated from things that depend on himself, he becomes subsistent through the beauty of Godhead. Abú Yaʿqúb Nahrajúrí says : ” A man’s true servantship (ʿubúdiyyat) lies in annihilation and subsistence,” because no one is capable of serving God with sincerity until he renounces all self-interest : therefore to renounce humanity (ádamiyyat) is annihilation, and to be sincere in servantship is subsistence. And Ibráhím b. Shaybán says: “The science of annihilation and subsistence turns on sincerity (ikhláṣ) and unity (wáḥidiyyat) and true servantship ; all else is error and heresy,” i.e., when anyone acknowledges the unity of God he feels himself overpowered by the omnipotence of God, and one who is overpowered (maghlúb) is annihilated in the might of his vanquisher ; and when his annihilation is rightly fulfilled on him, he confesses his weakness and sees no resource except to serve God, and tries to gain His satisfaction (riḍá). And whoever explains these terms otherwise, i.e. annihilation as meaning ” annihilation of substance ” and subsistence as meaning “subsistence of God (in Man)”, is a heretic and a Christian, as has been stated above.

Now I, ʿAlí b. ʿUthmán al-Jullábí, declare that all these sayings are near to each other in meaning, although they differ in expression ; and their real gist is this, that annihilation comes to a man through vision of the majesty of God and through the revelation of Divine omnipotence to his heart, so that in the overwhelming sense of His majesty this world and the next world are obliterated from his mind, and “states” and “stations” appear contemptible in the sight of his aspiring thought, and what is shown to him of miraculous grace vanishes into nothing : he becomes dead to reason and passion alike, dead even to annihilation itself ; and in that annihilation of annihilation his tongue proclaims God, and his mind and body are humble and abased, as in the beginning when Adam’s posterity were drawn forth from his loins without admixture of evil and took the pledge of servantship to God (Kor. vii, 171).

Such are the principles of annihilation and subsistence. I have discussed a portion of the subject in the chapter on Poverty and Ṣúfíism, and wherever these terms occur in the present work they bear the meaning which I have explained.

9. THE KHAFÍFÍS.

They are the followers of Abú ʿAbdallah Muḥammad b. Khafíf of Shíráz, an eminent mystic in his time and the author of celebrated treatises on various branches of Ṣúfiism. He was a man of great spiritual influence, and was not led by his lusts. I have heard that he contracted four hundred marriages. This was due to the fact that he was of royal descent, and that after his conversion the people of Shíráz paid great court to him, and the daughters of kings and nobles desired to marry him for the sake of the blessing which would accrue to them. He used to comply with their wishes, and then divorce them before consummation of the marriage. But in the course of his life forty wives, who were strangers to him (begána), two or three at a time, used to serve him as bed-makers (khádimán-i firásh), and one of them—she was the daughter of a vizier— lived with him for forty years. I have heard from Abú ‘l-Ḥasan ʿAlí b. Bakrán of Shíráz that one day several of his wives were gathered together, and each one was telling some story about him. They all agreed sese nunquam eum vidisse libidini obsequentem. Hitherto each of them had believed that she was peculiarly treated in this respect, and when they learned that the Shaykh’s behaviour was the same towards them all, they were astonished and doubted whether such was truly the case. Accordingly, they sent two of their number to question the vizier’s daughter, who was his favourite, as to his dealings with her. She replied : ” When the Shaykh wedded me and I was informed that he would visit me that night, I prepared a fine repast and adorned myself assiduously. As soon as he came and the food was brought in, he called me to him and looked for a while first at me and then at the food. Then he took my hand and drew it into his sleeve. From his breast to his navel there were fifteen knots (ʿaqd) growing out of his belly. He said, ’ Ask me what these are ; ’ so I asked him and he replied, ’ They are knots made by the tribulation and anguish of my abstinence in renouncing a face like this and viands like these.’ He said no more, but departed ; and that is all my intimacy with him.”

The form of his doctrine in Ṣúfiism is ” absence ” (ghaybat) and “presence” (ḥuḍúr). I will explain it as far as possible.

Discourse on Absence (ghaybat) and Presence (ḥuḍúr).

These terms, although apparently opposed to each other, express the same meaning from different points of view. ” Presence ” is ” presence of the heart ”, as a proof of intuitive faith (yaqín), so that what is hidden from it has the same force as what is visible to it. ” Absence ” is ” absence of the heart from all things except God ” to such an extent that it becomes absent from itself and absent even from its absence, so that it no longer regards itself ; and the sign of this state is withdrawal from all formal authority (ḥukm-i rusúm), as when a prophet is divinely preserved from what is unlawful. Accordingly, absence from one’s self is presence with God, and vice versâ. God is the lord of the human heart : when a divine rapture (jadhbat) overpowers the heart of the seeker, the absence of his heart becomes equivalent to its presence (with God) ; partnership (shirkat) and division (qismat) disappear, and relationship to “self” comes to an end, as one of the Shaykhs has said in verse :—

” Thou art the Lord of my heart, Without any partner : how, then, can it be divided ? ”

Inasmuch as God is sole lord of the heart, He has absolute power to keep it absent or present as He will, and, in regard to the essence of the case, this is the whole argument for the doctrine of His favourites ; but when a distinction is made, the Shaykhs hold various opinions on the subject, some preferring ” presence ” to ” absence ”, while others declare that “absence” is superior to ” presence ”. There is the same controversy as that concerning sobriety and intoxication, which I have explained above ; but these terms indicate that the human attributes are still subsistent, whereas ” absence ” and ” presence ” indicate that the human attributes are annihilated : therefore the latter terms are in reality more sublime. “Absence” is preferred to “presence” by Ibn ʿAṭá, Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj), Abú Bakr Shiblí, Bundár b. al-Ḥusayn, Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, Sumnún Muḥibb, and a number of the Shaykhs of ʿIráq. They say : “Thou thyself art the greatest of all veils between thee and God : when thou hast become absent from thyself, the evils implicit in thy being are annihilated in thee, and thy state undergoes a fundamental change : the ‘stations’ of novices become a veil to thee, and the ‘states’ of those who seek God become a source of mischief to thee ; thine eye is closed to thyself and to all that is other than God, and thy human attributes are consumed by the flame of proximity to God (qurbat). This is the same state of ‘absence’ in which God drew thee forth from the loins of Adam, and caused thee to hear His exalted word, and distinguished thee by the honorary robe of Unification and the garment of contemplation ; so long as thou wert absent from thyself, thou wert present with God face to face, but when thou becamest present with thine own attributes, thou becamest absent from thy proximity to God. Therefore thy ‘presence’ is thy perdition. This is the meaning of God’s word, ‘And now are ye come unto us alone, as We created you at first’ ” (Kor, vi, 94). On the other hand, Ḥárith Muḥásibí, Junayd, Sahl b. ʿAbdalláh, Abú Jaʿfar Ḥaddád,[^p273-1] Ḥamdún Qaṣṣár, Abú Muḥammad Jurayrí, Ḥuṣrí, Muḥammad b. Khafíf, who is the author of the doctrine, and others hold that “presence” is superior to “absence”. They argue that inasmuch as all excellences are bound up with “presence”, and as “absence” from one’s self is a way leading to “presence” with God, the way becomes an imperfection after you have arrived at the goal. “Presence” is the fruit of “absence”, but what light is to be found in “absence” without “presence”? A man must needs renounce heedlessness in order that, by means of this “absence”, he may attain to “presence” ; and when he has attained his object, the means by which he attained it has no longer any worth.

“The ‘absent’ one is not he who is absent from his country, But he who is absent from all desire. The ‘present’ one is not he who hath no desire, But he who hath no heart (no thought of worldly things), So that his desire is ever fixed on God.”

It is a well-known story that one of the disciples of Dhu ‘l-Nún set out to visit Abú Yazíd. When he came to Abú Yazíd’s cell and knocked at the door Abú Yazíd said : “Who art thou, and whom dost thou wish to see?” He answered : “Abú Yazíd.” Abú Yazíd said : “Who is Abú Yazíd, and where is he, and what thing is he? I have been seeking Abú Yazíd for a long while, but I have not found him.” When the disciple returned to Dhu ‘l-Nún and told him what had passed, Dhu ‘l-Nún said : “My brother Abú Yazíd is lost with those who are lost in God.” A certain man came to Junayd and said : “Be present with me for a moment that I may speak to thee.” Junayd answered : “O young man, you demand of me something that I have long been seeking. For many years I have been wishing to become present with myself a moment, but I cannot ; how, then, can I become present with you just now?” Therefore, “absence” involves the sorrow of being veiled, while “presence” involves the joy of revelation, and the former state can never be equal to the latter. Shaykh Abú Saʿíd says on this subject :—

Taqashshaʿa ghaymu ‘l-hajri ʿan qamari ‘l-hubbi Wa-asfara núru ‘l-subhi ʿan zulmati ‘l-ghaybi.

“The clouds of separation have been cleared away from the moon of love, And the light of morning has shone forth from the darkness of the Unseen.”

The distinction made by the Shaykhs between these two terms is mystical, and on the surface merely verbal, for they seem to be approximately the same. To be present with God is to be absent from one’s self—what is the difference?—and one who is not absent from himself is not present with God. Thus, forasmuch as the impatience of Job in his affliction did not proceed from himself, but on the contrary he was then absent from himself, God did not distinguish his impatience from patience, and when he cried, “Evil hath befallen me” (Kor. xxi, 83), God said, “Verily, he was patient.” This is evidently a judgment founded on the essential nature of the case (ḥukm ba-ʿayn). It is related that Junayd said : “For a time I was such that the inhabitants of heaven and earth wept over my bewilderment (ḥayrat) ; then, again, I became such that I wept over their absence (ghaybat) ; and now my state is such that I have no knowledge either of them or of myself.” This is an excellent indication of ” presence ”.

I have briefly explained the meaning of ” presence ” and ” absence ” in order that you may be acquainted with the doctrine of the Khafífís, and may also know in what sense these terms are used by the Ṣúfís.

10. THE SAYYÁRÍS.

They are the followers of Abú ‘l-ʿAbbás Sayyárí, the Imám of Merv. He was learned in all the sciences and associated with Abú Bakr Wásiṭí. At the present day he has numerous followers in Nasá and Merv. His school of Súfiism is the only one that has kept its original doctrine unchanged, and the cause of this fact is that Nasá and Merv have never been without some person who acknowledged his authority and took care that his followers should maintain the doctrine of their founder. The Sayyárís of Nasá carried on a discussion with those of Merv by means of letters, and I have seen part of this correspondence at Merv ; it is very fine. Their expositions are based on “union” (jamʿ) and “separation” (tafríqa). These words are common to all scientists and are employed by specialists in every branch of learning as a means of rendering their explanations intelligible, but they bear different meanings in each case. Thus, in arithmetic jamʿ denotes the addition and tafriqa the subtraction of numbers ; in grammar jamʿ is the agreement of words in derivation, while tafriqa is the difference in meaning ; in law jamʿ is analogy (qiyás) and tafriqa the characteristics of an authoritative text (ṣifát-i naṣṣ), or jamʿ is the text and tafriqa the analogy ; in divinity jamʿ denotes the essential and tafriqa the formal attributes of God.[^p276-1] But the Ṣúfís do not use these terms in any of the significations which I have mentioned. Now, therefore, I will explain the meaning attached to them by the Ṣúfís and the various opinions of the Shaykhs on this subject.

Discourse on Union (jamʿ) and Separation (tafriqa).

God united all mankind in His call, as He says, “And God calls to the abode of peace” ; then He separated them in respect of Divine guidance, and said, ” and guides whom He willeth into the right way” (Kor. x, 26). He called them all, and banished some in accordance with the manifestation of His will ; He united them all and gave a command, and then separated them, rejecting some and leaving them without succour, but accepting others and granting to them Divine aid ; then once more he united a certain number and separated them, giving to some immunity from sin and to others a propensity towards evil. Accordingly the real mystery of union is the knowledge and will of God, while separation is the manifestation of that which He commands and forbids: e.g., He commanded Abraham to behead Ishmael, but willed that he should not do so ; and He commanded Iblís to worship Adam, but willed the contrary; and He commanded Adam not to eat the corn, but willed that he should eat it ; and so forth. Union is that which He unites by His attributes, and separation is that which He separates by His acts. All this involves cessation of human volition and affirmation of the Divine will so as to exclude all personal initiative. As regards what has been said on the subject of union and separation, all the Sunnís, except the Muʿtazilites, are in agreement with the Ṣúfí Shaykhs, but at this point they begin to diverge, some applying the terms in question to the Divine Unity (tawḥíd), some to the Divine attributes, and some to the Divine acts. Those who refer to the Divine Unity say that there are two degrees of union, one in the attributes of God and the other in the attributes of Man. The former is the mystery of Unification (tawḥíd), in which human actions have no part whatever ; the latter denotes acknowledgment of the Divine Unity with sincere conviction and unfailing resolution. This is the opinion of Abú ʿAlí Rúdbárí. Those, again, who refer these terms to the Divine attributes say that union is an attribute of God, and separation an act of God in which Man does not co-operate, because God has no rival in Godhead. Therefore union can be referred only to His substance and attributes, for union is equality in the fundamental matter (al-taswiyat fí ʾl-aṣl), and no two things are equal in respect of eternity except His substance and His attributes, which, when they are separated by expository analysis (ʿibárat ú tafṣíl), are not united. This means that God has eternal attributes, which are peculiar to Him and subsist through Him ; and that He and His attributes are not two, for His Unity does not admit difference and number. On this ground, union is impossible except in the sense indicated above.

Separation in predicament (al-tafriqat fí ʾl-ḥukm) refers to the actions of God, all of which are separate in this respect. The predicament of one is being (wujúd), of another, not-being (ʿadam), but a not-being that is capable of being ; of another, annihilation (faná), and of another subsistence (baqá). There are some, again, who refer these terms to knowledge (ʿilm) and say that union is knowledge of the Divine Unity and separation knowledge of the Divine ordinances : hence theology is union and jurisprudence is separation. One of the Shaykhs has said, to the same effect : “Union is that on which theologians (ahl al-ʿilm) are agreed, and separation is that on which they differ.” Again, all the Ṣúfí mystics, whenever they use the term “separation” in the course of their expositions and indications, attach to it the meaning of “human actions” (makásib), e.g. self-mortification, and by “union” they signify “divine gifts” (mawáhib), e.g. contemplation. Whatever is gained by means of mortification is “separation”, and whatever is solely the result of Divine favour and guidance is “union”. It is Man’s glory that, while his actions exist and mortification is possible, he should escape by God’s goodness from the imperfection of his own actions, and should find them to be absorbed in the bounties of God, so that he depends entirely on God and commits all his attributes to His charge and refers all his actions to Him and none to himself, as Gabriel told the Apostle that God said: “My servant continually seeks access to Me by means of works of supererogation until I love him; and when I love him, I am his ear and his eye and his hand and his heart and his tongue: through Me he hears and sees and speaks and grasps,” i.e., in remembering Me he is enraptured by the remembrance (dhikr) of Me, and his own “acquisition” (kasb) is annihilated so as to have no part in his remembrance, and My remembrance overpowers his remembrance, and the relationship of humanity (ádamiyyat) is entirely removed from his remembrance: then My remembrance is his remembrance, and in his rapture he becomes even as Abú Yazíd in the hour when he said: “Glory to me! how great is my majesty!” These words were the outward sign of his speech, but the speaker was God. Similarly, the Apostle said: “God speaks by the tongue of ʿUmar.” The fact is that when the Divine omnipotence manifests its dominion over humanity, it transports a man out of his own being, so that his speech becomes the speech of God. But it is impossible that God should be mingled (imtizáj) with created beings or made one (ittiḥád) with His works or become incarnate (ḥáll) in things: God is exalted far above that, and far above that which the heretics ascribe to Him.

It may happen, then, that God’s love holds absolute sway over the heart of His servant, and that his reason and natural faculties are too weak to sustain its rapture and intensity, and that he loses all control of his power to act (kasb). This state is called “union”.[^p279-1] Herewith are connected all extraordinary miracles (iʿjáz) and acts of miraculous grace (karámát). All ordinary actions are “separation”, and all acts which violate custom are “union”. God bestows these miracles on His prophets and saints, and refers His actions to them and theirs to Himself, as He hath said : “Verily, they who swear fealty unto thee, swear fealty unto God” (Kor. xlviii, 10), and again : “Whosoever obeys the Apostle has obeyed God” (Kor. iv, 82). Accordingly, His saints are united (mujtamiʿ) by their inward feelings (asrár) and separated (muftariq) by their outward behaviour, so that their love of God is strengthened by the internal union, and the right fulfilment of their duty as servants of God is assured by their external separation. A certain great Shaykh says—

“I have realized that which is within me, and my tongue hath     conversed with Thee in secret, And we are united in one respect, but we are separated in     another. Although awe has hidden Thee from the glances of mine eye, Ecstasy has made Thee near to my inmost parts.”[^p279-2]

The state of being inwardly united he calls “union”, and the secret conversation of the tongue he calls “separation”; then he indicates that both union and separation are in himself, and attributes the basis (qáʿida) of them to himself. This is very subtle.

SECTION.

Here I must notice a matter of controversy between us and those who maintain that the manifestation of union is the denial of separation, because the two terms contradict each other, and that when anyone passes under the absolute sway of Divine guidance he ceases to act and to mortify himself. This is sheer nullification (taʿṭíl), for a man must never cease to practise devotion and mortify himself as long as he has the possibility and power of doing so. Moreover, union is not apart from separation, as light is apart from the sun, and accident from substance, and attribute from object : therefore, neither is self-mortification apart from Divine guidance, nor the Truth from the Law, nor discovery from search. But mortification may precede or follow Divine guidance. In the former case a man’s tribulation is increased, because he is in “absence” (ghaybat), while in the latter case he has no trouble or pain, because he is in ” presence ” (ḥaḍrat). Those to whom negation is the source (mashrab) of actions, and to whom it seems to be the substance (ʿayn) of action, commit a grave error. A man, however, may attain such a degree that he regards all his qualities as faulty and defective, for when he sees that his praiseworthy qualities are vicious and imperfect, his blameworthy qualities will necessarily appear more vicious. I adduce these considerations because some ignorant persons, who have fallen into an error that is closely akin to infidelity, assert that no result whatever depends upon our exertion, and that inasmuch as our actions and devotions are faulty and our mortifications are imperfect a thing left undone is better than a thing done. To this argument I reply : ” You are agreed in supposing that everything done by us has an energy (fiʿl), and you declare that our energies are a centre of defect and a source of evil and corruption : consequently you must also suppose that things left undone by us have an energy ; and since in both cases there is an energy involving defect, how can you regard that which we leave undone as better than that which we do? ” This notion evidently is a noxious delusion. Here we have an excellent criterion to distinguish the believer from the infidel. Both agree that their energies are inherently defective, but the believer, in accordance with God’s command, deems a thing done to be better than a thing left undone, while the infidel, in accordance with his denial of the Creator (taʿṭíl), deems a thing left undone to be better than a thing done.

Union, then, involves this—that, although the imperfection of separation is recognized, its authority (ḥukm) should not be let go ; and separation involves this—that, although one is veiled from the sight of union, he nevertheless thinks that separation is union. Muzayyin the Elder[^p281-1] says in this sense : ” Union is the state of privilege (khuṣúṣiyyat) and separation is the state of a servant (ʿubúdiyyat), these states being indissolubly combined with each other,” because it is a work of the privileged state to fulfil the duties of servantship ; therefore, although the tediousness and painfulness of self-mortification and personal effort may be removed from one who performs all that is required of him in this respect, it is impossible that the substance (ʿayn) of self-mortification and religious obligation should be removed from anyone, even though he be in the essence of union, unless he has an evident excuse that is generally acknowledged by the authority of the religious law. Now I will explain this matter in order that you may better understand it.

Union is of two kinds : (1) sound union (jamʿ-i salámat), and (2) broken union (jamʿ-i taksír). Sound union is that which God produces in a man when he is in the state of rapture and ecstasy, and when God causes him to receive and fulfil His commandments and to mortify himself. This was the state of Sahl b. ʿAbdallah and Abú Ḥafṣ Ḥaddád and Abú ʾl-ʿAbbás Sayyárí, the author of the doctrine. Abú Yazíd of Bisṭám, Abú Bakr Shiblí, Abú ʾl-Ḥasan Ḥuṣrí, and a number of great Shaykhs were continually in a state of rapture until the hour of prayer arrived ; then they returned to consciousness, and after performing their prayers became enraptured again. While thou art in the state of separation, thou art thou, and thou fulfillest the command of God ; but when God transports thee He has the best right to see that thou performest His command, for two reasons : firstly, in order that the token of servantship may not be removed from thee, and secondly, in order that He may keep His promise that He will never let the law of Muḥammad be abrogated. ” Broken union ” (jamʿ-i taksír) is this : that a man’s judgment becomes distraught and bewildered, so that it is like the judgment of a lunatic: then he is either excused from performing his religious obligations or rewarded (mashkúr) for performing them ; and the state of him who is rewarded is sounder than the state of him who is excused.

You must know, in short, that union does not involve any peculiar “station” (maqám) or any peculiar “state” (ḥál), for union is the concentration of one’s thoughts (jamʿ-i himmat) upon the object of one’s desire. According to some the revelation of this matter takes place in the ” stations ” (maqámát), according to others in the ” states ” (aḥwál), and in either case the desire of the “united” person (ṣáḥib jamʿ) is attained by negating his desire. This holds good in everything, e.g., Jacob concentrated his thoughts on Joseph, so that he had no thought but of him ; and Majnún concentrated his thoughts on Laylá, so that he saw only her in the whole world, and all created things assumed the form of Laylá in his eyes. One day, when Abú Yazíd was in his cell, some one came and asked : ” Is Abú Yazíd here ? ” He answered : ” Is any one here except God ? ” And a certain Shaykh relates that a dervish came to Mecca and remained in contemplation of the Kaʿba for a whole year, during which time he neither ate nor drank, nor slept, nor cleansed himself, because of the concentration of his thoughts upon the Kaʿba, which thereby became the food of his body and the drink of his soul. The principle in all these cases is the same, viz. that God divided the one substance of His love and bestows a particle thereof, as a peculiar gift, upon every one of His friends in proportion to their enravishment with Him ; then He lets down upon that particle the shrouds of humanity and nature and temperament and spirit, in order that by its powerful working it may transmute to its own quality all the particles that are attached to it, until the lover’s clay is wholly converted into love, and all his actions and looks become so many indispensable conditions of love. This state is named ” union ” alike by those who regard the inward meaning and those who regard the outward expression. Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) says in this sense :

” Thy will be done, O my Lord and Master ! Thy will be done, O my purpose and meaning ! O essence of my being, O goal of my desire, O my speech and my hints and my gestures ! O all of my all, O my hearing and my sight, O my whole and my element and my particles ?”

Therefore, to one whose qualities are only borrowed from God, it is a disgrace to affirm his own existence, and an act of dualism (zunnár) to pay any heed to the phenomenal universe ; and all created objects are despicable to his soaring thought. Some have been led by their dialectical subtlety and their admiration of phraseology to speak of ” the union of union ” (jamʿ al-jamʿ). This is a good expression as phrases go, but if you consider the meaning, it is better not to predicate union of union, because the term ” union ” cannot properly be applied except to separation. Before union can be united it must first have been separated, whereas the fact is that union does not change its state. The expression, therefore, is liable to be misunderstood, because one who is ” united ” does not look forth from himself to what is above or to what is below him. Do not you perceive that when the two worlds were displayed to the Apostle on the night of the Ascension he paid no heed to anything ? He was in ” union ”, and one who is ” united ” does not behold ” separation ”. Hence God said : “His gaze swerved not, nor did it stray” (Kor. liii, 17). In my early days I composed a book on this subject and entitled it Kitáb al-bayán li-ahl al-ʿiyán,[^p283-1] and I have also discussed the matter at length in the Baḥr al-qulúb[^p283-2] in the chapter on “ Union ”. I will not now burden my readers by adding to what I have said here.

This sketch of the doctrine of the Sayyáris concludes my account of those Ṣúfí sects which are approved and follow the path of true theosophy. I now turn to the opinions of those heretics who have connected themselves with the Ṣúfís and have adopted Ṣúfístic phraseology as a means of promulgating their heresy. My aim is to expose their errors in order that novices may not be deceived by their pretensions and may guard themselves from mischief.

11. THE ḤULÚLÍS.

Of those two reprobate sects which profess to belong to Ṣúfíism and make the Ṣúfís partners in their error, one follows Abú Ḥulmán of Damascus.[^p284-1] The stories which his adherents relate of him do not agree with what is written about him in the books of the Shaykhs, for, while the Ṣúfís regard him as one of themselves, these sectaries impute to him the doctrines of incarnation (ḥulúl) and commixture (imtizáj) and transmigration of spirits (naskh-i arwáḥ). I have seen this statement in the book of Muqaddasí,[^p284-2] who attacks him ; and the same notion of him has been formed by theologians, but God knows best what is the truth. The other sect refer their doctrine to Fáris,[^p284-3] who pretends to have derived it from Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj), but he is the only one of Ḥusayn’s followers who holds such tenets. I saw Abú Jaʿfar Ṣaydaláni[^p284-4] with four thousand men, dispersed throughout ʿIráq, who were Ḥallájís ; and they all cursed Fáris on account of this doctrine. Moreover, in the compositions of al-Ḥalláj himself there is nothing but profound theosophy.

I, ʿAlí b. ʿUthmán al-Jullábí, say that I do not know who Fáris and Abú Ḥulmán were or what they said, but anyone who holds a doctrine conflicting with Unification and true theosophy has no part in religion at all. If religion, which is the root, is not firmly based, Ṣúfiism, which is the branch and offspring of religion, must with more reason be unsound, for it is inconceivable that miracles and evidences should be manifested except to religious persons and Unitarians. All the errors of these sectaries are in regard to the spirit (rúḥ). Now, therefore, I will explain its nature and principles according to the Sunní canon, and in the course of my explanation I will notice the erroneous and delusive opinions of the heretics in order that your faith may be strengthened thereby.

Discourse on the Spirit (al-rúḥ).

You must know that knowledge concerning the existence of the spirit is intuitive (ḍarúrí), and the intelligence is unable to apprehend its (the spirit’s) nature. Every Moslem divine and sage has expressed some conjectural opinion on this point, which has also been debated by unbelievers of various sorts. When the unbelievers of Quraysh, prompted by the Jews, sent Naḍr b. al-Ḥárith to question the Apostle concerning the nature and essence of the spirit, God in the first place affirmed its substance and said, “And they will ask thee concerning the spirit”; then He denied its eternity, saying, “Answer, ‘The spirit belongs to that which (i.e. the creation of which) my Lord commanded’” (Kor. xvii, 87). And the Apostle said : “The spirits are hosts gathered together : those that know one another agree, and those that do not know one another disagree.” There are many similar proofs of the existence of the spirit, but they contain no authoritative statement as to its nature. Some have said that the spirit is the life whereby the body lives, a view which is also held by a number of scholastic philosophers. According to this view the spirit is an accident (ʿaraḍ), which at God’s command keeps the body alive, and from which proceed conjunction, motion, cohesion, and similar accidents by which the body is changed from one state to another. Others, again, declare that the spirit is not life, but that life does not exist without it, just as the spirit does not exist without the body, and that the two are never found apart, because they are inseparable, like pain and the knowledge of pain. According to this view also the spirit is an accident, like life. All the Ṣúfí Shaykhs, however, and most orthodox Moslems hold that the spirit is a substance, and not an attribute ; for, so long as it is connected with the body, God continually creates life in the body, and the life of Man is an attribute and by it he lives, but the spirit is deposited in his body and may be separated from him while he is still living, as in sleep. But when it leaves him, intelligence and knowledge can no longer remain with him, for the Apostle has said that the spirits of martyrs are in the crops of birds : consequently it must be a substance ; and the Apostle has said that the spirits are hosts (junúd), and hosts are subsistent (báqí), and no accident can subsist, for an accident does not stand by itself.

The spirit, then, is a subtle body (jismí laṭíf), which comes and goes by the command of God. On the night of the Ascension, when the Apostle saw in Heaven Adam, Joseph, Moses, Aaron, Jesus, and Abraham, it was their spirits that he saw ; and if the spirit were an accident, it would not stand by itself so as to become visible, for it would need a locus in substances, and substances are gross (kathíf). Accordingly, it has been ascertained that the spirit is subtle and corporeal (jasím), and being corporeal, it is visible, but visible only to the eye of intelligence (chashm-i dil). And spirits may reside in the crops of birds or may be armies that move to and fro, as the Apostolic Traditions declare.

Here we are at variance with the heretics, who assert that the spirit is eternal (qadím), and worship it, and regard it as the sole agent and governor of things, and call it the uncreated spirit of God, and aver that it passes from one body to another. No popular error has obtained such wide acceptance as this doctrine, which is held by the Christians, although they express it in terms that appear to conflict with it, and by all the Indians, Tibetans, and Chinese, and is supported by the consensus of opinion among the Shíʿites, Carmathians, and Ismáʿílís (Báṭiniyán), and is embraced by the two false sects above-mentioned. All these sectaries base their belief on certain propositions and bring forward proofs in defence of their assertion. I ask them this question : “What do you mean by ‘eternity’ (qidam)? Do you mean the pre-existence of a non-eternal thing, or an eternal thing that never came into being?” If they mean the pre-existence of a non-eternal thing, then there is no difference between us in principle, for we too say that the spirit is non-eternal (muḥdath), and that it existed before the body, as the Apostle said : “God created the spirits two thousand years before the bodies.” Accordingly, the spirit is one sort of God’s creatures, and He joins it to another sort of His creatures, and in joining them together He produces life through His predestination. But the spirit cannot pass from body to body, because, just as a body cannot have two lives, so a spirit cannot have two bodies. If these facts were not affirmed in Apostolic Traditions by an Apostle who speaks the truth, and if the matter were considered purely from the standpoint of a reasonable intelligence, then the spirit would be life and nothing else, and it would be an attribute, not a substance. Now suppose, on the other hand, they say that the spirit is an eternal thing that never came into being. In this case, I ask : “Does it stand by itself or by something else?” If they say, “By itself,” I ask them, “Is God its world (ʿálam) or not?” If they answer that God is not its world, they affirm the existence of two eternal beings, which is contrary to reason, for the eternal is infinite, and the essence of one eternal being would limit the other. But if they answer that God is its world, then I say that God is eternal and His creatures are non-eternal : it is impossible that the eternal should be commingled with the non-eternal or made one with it, or become immanent in it, or that the non-eternal should be the place of the eternal or that the eternal should carry it ; for whatever is joined to anything must be like that to which it is joined, and only homogeneous things are capable of being united and separated. And if they say that the spirit does not stand by itself, but by something else, then it must be either an attribute (ṣifat) or an accident (ʿaraḍ). If it is an accident, it must either be in a locus or not. If it is in a locus, its locus must be like itself, and neither can be called eternal ; and to say that it has no locus is absurd, for an accident cannot stand by itself. If, again, they say that the spirit is an eternal attribute—and this is the doctrine of the Ḥulúlís and those who believe in metempsychosis (tanásukhíyán)—and call it an attribute of God, I reply that an eternal attribute of God cannot possibly become an attribute of His creatures ; for, if His life could become the life of His creatures, similarly His power could become their power ; and inasmuch as an attribute stands by its object, how can an eternal attribute stand by a non-eternal object? Therefore, as I have shown, the eternal has no connexion with the non-eternal, and the doctrine of the heretics who affirm this is false. The spirit is created and is under God’s command. Anyone who holds another belief is in flagrant error and cannot distinguish what is non-eternal from what is eternal. No saint, if his saintship be sound, can possibly be ignorant of the attributes of God. I give praise without end to God, who hath guarded us from heresies and dangers, and hath bestowed on us intelligence to examine and refute them by our arguments, and hath given us faith in order that we may know Him. When men who see only the exterior hear stories of this kind from theologians, they imagine that this is the doctrine of all aspirants to Ṣúfíism. They are grossly mistaken and utterly deceived, and the consequence is that they are blinded to the beauty of our mystic knowledge and to the loveliness of Divine saintship and to the flashes of spiritual illumination, because eminent Ṣúfís regard popular applause and popular censure with equal indifference.

SECTION.

One of the Shaykhs says : ” The spirit in the body is like fire in fuel ; the fire is created (makhlúq) and the coal is made (maṣnúʿ).” Nothing can be described as eternal except the essence and attributes of God. Abú Bakr Wásiṭí has discoursed on the spirit more than any of the Ṣúfí Shaykhs. It is related that he said : ” There are ten stations (maqámát) of spirits : (1) the spirits of the sincere (mukhliṣán), which are imprisoned in a darkness and know not what will befall them ; (2) the spirits of pious men (pársá-mardán), which in the heaven of this world rejoice in the fruits of their actions and take pleasure in devotions, and walk by the strength thereof ; (3) the spirits of disciples (murtdán), which are in the fourth heaven and dwell with the angels in the delights of veracity, and in the shadow of their good works ; (4) the spirits of the beneficent (ahl-i minan), which are hung in lamps of light from the Throne of God, and their food is mercy, and their drink is favour and proximity ; (5) the spirits of the faithful (ahl-i wafá), which thrill with joy in the veil of purity and the station of electness (istifá) ; (6) the spirits of martyrs (shahídán), which are in Paradise in the crops of birds, and go where they will in its gardens early and late ; (7) the spirits of those who yearn (mushtáqán), which stand on the carpet of respect (adab) clad in the luminous veils of the Divine attributes ; (8) the spirits of gnostics (ʿárifán), which, in the precincts of holiness, listen at morn and eve to the word of God and see their places in Paradise and in this world ; (9) the spirits of lovers (dústán), which have become absorbed in contemplation of the Divine beauty and the station of revelation (kashf), and perceive nothing but God and rest content with no other thing ; (10) the spirits of dervishes, which have found favour with God in the abode of annihilation, and have suffered a transformation of quality and a change of state.”

It is related concerning the Shaykhs that they have seen the spirit in different shapes, and this may well be, because, as I have said, it is created, and a subtle body (jismí laṭíf) is necessarily visible. God shows it to every one of His servants, when and as it pleases Him.

I, ʿAlí b. ʿUthmán al-Jullábí, declare that our life is wholly through God, and our stability is through Him, and our being kept alive is the act of God in us, and we live through His creation, not through His essence and attributes. The doctrine of the animists (rúḥíyán) is entirely false. Belief in the eternity of the spirit is one of the grave errors which prevail among the vulgar, and is expressed in different ways, e.g. they use the terms ” soul ” and ” matter ” (nafs u hayúlá), or ” light ” and ” darkness ” (núr u ẓulmat), and those Ṣúfí impostors speak of ” annihilation ” and ” subsistence ” (faná u baqá), or ” union ” and ” separation ” (jamʿ u tafríqa), or adopt similar phrases as a fair mask for their infidelity. But the Ṣúfís abjure these heretics, for the Ṣúfís hold that saintship and true love of God depend on knowledge of Him, and anyone who does not know the eternal from the non-eternal is ignorant in what he says, and the intelligent pay no attention to what is said by the ignorant. Now I will unveil the portals of the practice and theory of the Ṣúfís, furnishing my explanation with evident proofs, in order that you may the more easily comprehend my meaning, and that any sceptic possessed of insight may be led back into the right way, and that I may thereby gain a blessing and a Divine reward.